

The Signs of All Times

Entoptic Phenomena in Upper Palaeolithic Art¹

by J. D. Lewis-Williams
and T. A. Dowson

Elucidation of the geometric signs in Upper Palaeolithic art is hampered by an absence of directly relevant ethnography and by the logical impossibility of inducing meaning from numerical rock-art data. This paper approaches the signs by constructing a neuropsychological model of the apprehension of entoptic phenomena in three stages of altered states of consciousness. The utility of the model is assessed by applying it to two known shamanistic rock arts, San and Shoshonean Coso. It is then applied to Upper Palaeolithic mobile and parietal art to show that this art was also associated with altered states of consciousness. Some of the implications of this conclusion for understanding the meaning of entoptic elements, the diverse contexts of Upper Palaeolithic art, the co-occurrence of signs and representational art, and the origins of art are briefly considered.

J. D. LEWIS-WILLIAMS is Professor of Cognitive Archaeology and Director of the Rock Art Research Unit in the Department of Archaeology of the University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg 2050, South Africa). He was educated at the University of Cape Town (B.A.) and the University of Natal (Ph.D.). His publications include *Believing and Seeing: Symbolic Meanings in Southern San Rock Paintings* (London: Academic Press, 1981), *The Rock Art of Southern Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Milan: Jaca Book, 1983), and "The Economic and Social Context of Southern San Rock Art" (*CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY* 23:429-49).

T. A. DOWSON is Research Officer in the Rock Art Research Unit, Department of Archaeology, University of the Witwatersrand. He obtained a B.Sc. degree in archaeology and botany in 1987.

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Signs are small measurable things, but interpretations are illimitable.

GEORGE ELIOT, *Middlemarch*

The so-called signs of European Upper Palaeolithic art² have been a persistently intractable challenge to archaeologists. By and large, two approaches have been employed to elucidate their meaning. Some writers, especially those of earlier decades, invoked ethnographic analogies to argue that the signs were traps, huts, or shrines inhabited by spirits (e.g., Breuil 1952:24). More recently, writers have turned from ethnography to internal analysis, believing it possible to discover an inherent order and then, without recourse to analogues, to induce meaning from that order (e.g., Laming 1962; Leroi-Gourhan 1968a, b; Marshack 1972; Sauvet, Sauvet, and Włodarczyk 1977; Sauvet and Sauvet 1979; Faris 1983). Various patterns have been suggested and supported, some more, some less convincingly, by quantitative work (Parkington 1969, Rosenfeld 1971, Stevens 1975), but the next step, induction of meaning, has run into snags, for it is logically impossible to induce meaning from numerical rock-art data, as it is from any data (Lewis-Williams 1983b:101; Lewis-Williams and Loubser 1986). Although much of this inductive work has proved valuable and provocative, no explanation for the signs has won general acceptance. Today there is a "swing away from a fruitless search for meaning to a consolidation of all we know about the art" (Bahn 1986b:55; see also Conkey 1983). Many believe that "it is very probable that we shall never know the meaning of Palaeolithic art" (Sieveking 1979:209; Halverson 1987:70).

Less pessimistically, we develop a model for classifying and addressing Upper Palaeolithic signs that avoids simplistic ethnographic analogy (Wylie 1985) and the impasse of induction from internal analysis. This approach derives from current research on San (Bushman) rock art in southern Africa, where the shamanistic nature of the art has turned attention to altered states of consciousness. Southern Africa is a particularly favoured area because shamanistic images can be approached simultaneously from two directions. In the first place, neuropsychological research explains the forms of certain depictions, and, secondly, the meanings of some of these depictions can be established from directly relevant ethnography. But southern African examples only underscore the difficulty of rock-art research in regions and periods for which no ethnography exists (Davis 1982; Jones 1982; Sauvet 1982; Marshack 1986:80-81). Sieveking (1979:208) and others (e.g., Conkey 1983:223) are no doubt right in an absolute sense that Upper Palaeolithic art has "no real counterpart in any present-day primitive community," but we respond to their "ethnographic despair" by arguing that a

2. "Palaeolithic art" is an unsatisfactory term that prejudices aesthetic sensibilities and obscures the variety of genres, but, in the absence of a better and equally succinct phrase, we retain it (cf. Conkey 1984, n.d.; Davis 1986:193).

neurological bridge affords some access to the Upper Palaeolithic.

Entoptic Phenomena

The strong evidence that chimpanzees, baboons, monkeys, cats, dogs, and other animals hallucinate suggests that altered states of consciousness and hallucinations are a function of the mammalian, not just the human, nervous system (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:81-104) and that "non-real" visual percepts were experienced long before the Upper Palaeolithic. Indeed, australopithecines probably hallucinated. Be that as it may, the nervous system is a human universal, and we accept that, by the Upper Palaeolithic, it was much the same as it is now. The content of early human mental imagery is, however, more problematic than its existence, because cultural expectations inform the imagery to a considerable extent. For a conservative beginning to an investigation of possible Upper Palaeolithic mental imagery we therefore comment less on culturally informed hallucinations than on a feature of altered states completely controlled by the nervous system.

Under certain circumstances the visual system generates a range of luminous percepts that are independent of light from an external source (e.g., Klüver 1926, 1942; Knoll et al. 1963; Horowitz 1964; Oster 1970; Richards 1971; Eichmeier and Höfer 1974; Siegel and Jarvik 1975; Siegel 1977, 1978; Asaad and Shapiro 1986). Although there was interest in these visual percepts in the 19th century and at the beginning of this one, it was not until the 1920s that Heinrich Klüver began the systematic analysis of the phenomena. Working under laboratory conditions, Klüver (1926; 1942:177) concluded that these percepts were not just visual "dust"; they had form. Abstracting redundant form elements from his subjects' reports of altered states of consciousness, he arrived at four groupings of the percepts. Some years later, Horowitz (1975:178), unaware of Klüver's work, similarly abstracted redundant form elements from reports of altered states. He then found that his elements, despite their "indescrivableness" (Klüver 1926:503), corresponded very largely with Klüver's categorisation. Other workers (e.g., Knoll 1958, Horowitz 1964, Richards 1971, Eichmeier and Höfer 1974, Siegel 1977) have confirmed these findings and identified further recurring form elements. Their research has shown that these visual phenomena, although complex and diverse, take geometric forms such as grids, zigzags, dots, spirals, and catenary curves. All these percepts are experienced as incandescent, shimmering, moving, rotating, and sometimes enlarging patterns; they also grade one into another and combine in a bewildering way (Klüver 1942:176). Because they derive from the human nervous system, all people who enter certain altered states of consciousness, no matter what their cultural background, are liable to perceive them (Eichmeier and Höfer 1974, Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a).

These geometric visual percepts can be induced by a

variety of means. Under laboratory conditions, electrical stimulation (e.g., Knoll and Kugler 1959, Knoll et al. 1963, Brindley 1973, Eichmeier and Höfer 1974) and flickering light (Young et al. 1975) produce them, but, although flickering fire light may have played a role in the past, we clearly have to look elsewhere to explain prehistoric experience. Psychoactive drugs generate the percepts, but fatigue, sensory deprivation, intense concentration, auditory driving, migraine, schizophrenia, hyperventilation, and rhythmic movement are some other generating factors (Klüver 1942; Horowitz 1965: 512-18; Sacks 1970; Siegel and Jarvik 1975). Much more research will have to be done before it can be established whether specific geometric forms are associated with particular circumstances of generation (but see Knoll et al. 1963).

Nomenclature for these visual percepts poses some problems. Hoping to avoid a diversionary logomachy, we follow Tyler (1978:1633) in using *entoptic phenomena* (from the Greek, "within vision") to mean visual sensations derived from the structure of the optic system anywhere from the eyeball to the cortex. This term covers two classes of geometric percept that appear to derive from different parts of the visual system—phosphenes and form constants. *Phosphenes* can be induced by physical stimulation, such as pressure on the eyeball, and are thus entophthalmic ("within the eye") (Walker 1981). *Form constants* derive from the optic system, probably beyond the eyeball itself (Knoll et al. 1963, Siegel 1977). We distinguish these two kinds of entoptic phenomena from *hallucinations*, which have no foundation in the actual structure of the optic system. Unlike phosphenes and form constants, hallucinations include iconic visions of culturally controlled items such as animals, as well as somatic and aural experiences. These definitions are somewhat complicated by similarity between certain phosphenes and form constants and the simultaneous experience of form constants and hallucinations and, moreover, by a tendency for writers to use "hallucination" to cover phosphenes, form constants, and hallucinations as now defined. One of us (JDL-W) has been guilty of such confusion, but we feel that greater definitional clarity should be sought if we are to attain more precision in our understanding of shamanistic experience. Nevertheless, at the present stage of research it is premature to distinguish between phosphenes and form constants (cf. Hedges 1983:59), and we therefore use only the generic term "entoptic phenomena" (or "entoptics") for the largely geometric visual percepts. We reserve "hallucination" for more complex iconic visions (Siegel 1977:134; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a:12-13).

A Neuropsychological Model

The universality of entoptic phenomena encourages us to construct a model of the ways in which mental imagery is perceived by people in certain altered states of consciousness. Ultimately, such a model should be rele-

vant to all arts derived from these altered states. Because we are concerned principally with entoptics, we say less about iconic hallucinations, but the intimate relationship between the two must be clarified by any model that seeks to explain the imagery of altered states. We distinguish three components within our model: types of entoptic phenomena, principles governing their perception, and stages in the progression of altered states of consciousness.

ENTOPTIC FORMS

Although there are numerous entoptic forms, certain types recur. We have selected six of the commonest types from the range established by neurologists and Spsychologists (see, for example, Klüver 1942:172-77; Knoll and Kugler 1959; Horowitz 1965; Oster 1970; Richards 1971; Eichmeier and Höfer 1974; Siegel 1977). (An important omission is the spiral or vortex, but we feel this deserves special treatment.) These are (1) a basic grid and its development in a lattice and expanding hexagonal pattern, (2) sets of parallel lines, (3) dots and short flecks, (4) zigzag lines crossing the field of vision (reported by some subjects as angular, by others as undulating), (5) nested catenary curves (in a developed form the outer arc comprises flickering zigzags), and (6) filigrees or thin meandering lines. Because these phenomena are mercurial, we do not suppose our six categories to be as rigid as this list seems to imply. Nevertheless, we take the six entoptic types to be fundamental because they were established by abstracting redundant elements from a large number of reports.

PRINCIPLES OF PERCEPTION

According to neuropsychological studies, the ways in which subjects perceive both entoptic phenomena and iconic hallucinations are many and varied. We have, nevertheless, formulated seven general principles that govern their perception: replication, fragmentation, integration, superpositioning, juxtapositioning, reduplication, and rotation.

When a subject perceives an entoptic phenomenon in one of the fundamental forms, we speak of *replication*, our first principle. The entoptics subsumed under this principle are, in a sense, unmistakable; those covered by the second principle, *fragmentation*, are less so because research has shown that an entoptic phenomenon may be broken down into minimal components (Horowitz 1975:178); a grid, for example, may be fragmented into a ladder-like form. The third principle, *integration*, moves in the opposite direction and blends images to build up complex patterns (Klüver 1942:177; Siegel 1977:134). For instance, a grid may blend with a series of zigzags. Two less intimate ways of bringing together visual images are *superpositioning* and *juxtapositioning*. One entoptic form may be projected against another (Knoll et al. 1963: 205, 208, 214; Walker 1981:148) or simply appear next to it. The next principle is *reduplication*. What may start as a single image becomes a series of duplicated

images, such as festoons of catenary curves (Klüver 1942:177, 182, 187; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1972:92; Siegel 1977:134). Finally, entoptic phenomena *rotate* in the field of vision (Klüver 1926:504, 505; 1942:181; Knoll et al. 1963:204-6).

Although we have referred to only entoptic phenomena, these seven principles also apply to iconic hallucinations and in some cases link the two kinds of percept. In such an experience a grid, for example, may be integrated with an animal; in other instances an animal may be blended with characteristics of another species. The principles are necessarily a simplification of the many distortions and alterations experienced in mental imagery (Klüver 1942:187), but, after the identification of entoptic forms, they are a second step in building a neuropsychological model of the ways in which mental imagery is apprehended.

STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL IMAGERY

As a third step we examine three broadly conceived stages in the progression of mental imagery during altered states of consciousness.

In Stage 1 subjects experience entoptic phenomena alone (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:111; Siegel 1977:132). These are perceived with the eyes open or closed (Klüver 1942:503; Siegel 1977:132) and tend to be located at reading distance (Siegel 1977:139), though they also appear to recede and advance. The phenomena cannot be consciously controlled; they seem to have a life of their own (Klüver 1926:504; Siegel 1977:132). They are, furthermore, characterized by varied and saturated colours (Knoll et al. 1963; Siegel 1977:132). Sometimes a bright light in the centre of the field of vision obscures all but peripheral images (Klüver 1926:503; Siegel 1977:134). The rate of change of the phenomena seems to vary from one hallucinogen to another (Knoll et al. 1963:221) but is generally rapid. Laboratory subjects new to the experience find it difficult to keep pace with the rapid flow of imagery, but, significantly, training and familiarity with the experience increase their powers of observation and description (Siegel 1977:134).

In Stage 2 subjects try to make sense of entoptics by elaborating them into iconic forms (Horowitz 1964:514; 1975:177, 178, 181). In a normal state of consciousness the brain receives a constant stream of sense impressions. A visual image reaching the brain is decoded (as, of course, are other sense impressions) by being matched against a store of experience. If a "fit" can be effected, the image is "recognised." In altered states the nervous system itself becomes a "sixth sense" (Heinze 1986) that produces a variety of images including entoptic phenomena. The brain attempts to recognise, or decode, these forms as it does impressions supplied by the nervous system in a normal state of consciousness. Horowitz (1975:177) links this process of making sense to the disposition of the subject: "Thus the same ambiguous round shape on initial perceptual representation can be 'illusioned' into an orange (if the subject is hungry), a breast (if he is in a state of heightened sexual drive), a

cup of water (if he is thirsty), or an anarchist's bomb (if he is hostile or fearful)."

As subjects move from this stage into Stage 3, marked changes in imagery occur (Siegel 1977:132). Many laboratory subjects report experiencing a vortex or rotating tunnel that seems to surround them, and there is a progressive exclusion of perceptual information (Horowitz 1975:178). The sides of the vortex are marked by a lattice of squares like television screens. The images on these "screens" are the first spontaneously produced iconic hallucinations; they eventually overlie the vortex as entoptics give way to iconic images (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:127, 143; Siegel 1977:136). The iconic images appear to derive from memory and are often associated with powerful emotional experiences (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:111; Siegel 1977:136). This shift to iconic imagery is also accompanied by an increase in vividness. Subjects stop using similes to describe their experiences and assert that the images are indeed what they appear to be. They "lose insight into the differences between literal and analogous meanings" (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:128). Nevertheless, even in this essentially iconic stage, entoptic phenomena may persist: iconic imagery is "often projected against a background of geometric forms" (Siegel 1977:134).

These three stages are not necessarily sequential. Some subjects appear to move directly into the third stage, while others do not progress beyond the first. It does, however, appear that exclusively entoptic imagery is characteristic of the first stage. Nor should the stages be considered discrete. Construal, for instance, may occur in Stage 3, with construed entoptics accompanying true iconic hallucinations. Although entoptics still occur in Stage 3, they are secondary and tend to frame the principal iconic elements (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a:147). The three stages we propose should therefore be seen as cumulative rather than sequential.

This three-stage progression was established by research using mescaline and LSD. We do not know if the trajectory of mental imagery is identical for all drugs and for non-drug-induced states, but we believe that a broad similarity can be accepted. This assumption is partially justified by the identification by the Tukano of the Colombian northwestern Amazon of three stages in their *yajé*-induced visual experiences (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a:12-13). They speak of an initial stage in which "grid patterns, zigzag lines and undulating lines alternate with eye-shaped motifs, many-coloured concentric circles or endless chains of brilliant dots" (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978b:291-92). During this stage they watch "passively these innumerable scintillating patterns which seem to approach or to retreat, or to change and recombine into a multitude of colourful panels." We emphasise that these forms are depicted by the Tukano and identified by them as elements in their *yajé* visions. Reichel-Dolmatoff (1972, 1978a, b) has demonstrated their isomorphism with entoptic phenomena established quite independently by laboratory experiments. In the second stage recognised by the Tukano there is a diminution of these patterns and the slow formation of

larger images. Together with these they perceive recognisable shapes of people, animals, and monsters. The intense activity of this stage gives way to more placid visions in the final stage. The Tukano's Stages 1 and 2 conform to our Stages 1 and 3 respectively.

The model we propose thus comprises a set of six entoptic forms, seven principles governing the perception of entoptic phenomena and iconic hallucinations, and three stages in the progression of altered states of consciousness.

Entoptic Phenomena in Shamanistic and Upper Palaeolithic Art

To examine the applicability of this neuropsychological model we apply it to two known shamanistic arts from different continents. If the model proves appropriate to these arts, we can use it to assess arts not known a priori to be associated with altered states.

The first shamanistic art is that of the San. Because San rock art is now widely accepted as shamanistic,³ we do not rehearse the debate about it here.⁴ We merely point out that 19th- and 20th-century ethnography records San shamanistic practices in some detail and provides a firm foundation for the interpretations that follow (for an account of the ethnography and its relevance to San rock art, see Lewis-Williams and Bieseke 1978; Lewis-Williams 1980; 1981a:25-37; 1987a).

In referring to the San we use "shaman" rather than the more usual "medicine man," but we do not thereby imply anything about the social position of the person, his or her mental health, or, indeed, many of the other characteristics often associated with the very heterogeneous phenomenon called shamanism. Instead we emphasise what we believe to be the most important and overriding feature of shamanism and the one with which this paper is principally concerned—altered states of consciousness. This emphasis is echoed by San words for "shaman." The modern !Kung of the northern Kalahari Desert use *n/um k"au*, which means "owner of *n/um*." *N/um* is a supernatural potency that Marshall (1969:351) likens to electricity: harnessed it is beneficial, uncontrolled it is dangerous. The 19th-century southern /Xam San spoke of a *!gi:xa* (pl. *!gi:ten*). *!Gi* is the /Xam equivalent of *n/um*, and the final syllable, *-xa*, means "full," as in "wrathful." /Xam shamans activated their potency to enter trance, as the !Kung still do today, either during large dances or in more solitary circumstances (Lewis-Williams n.d.a). Hallucinogens

3. See Lewis-Williams (1980, 1981a, 1982, 1985a, b, 1987a), Lewis-Williams and Loubser (1986), Huffman (1983), Maggs and Sealy (1983), Yates, Golson, and Hall (1985), Manhire et al. (1986), Parkinson et al. (1986), Campbell (1986, 1987).

4. Traditionally, San rock art was seen as the product of hunting magic rituals or as a narrative of daily life with a small "mythical" component. For the various positions adopted in this debate, see Lewis-Williams (1982, 1983a, b, 1984a, b, 1987a, b), Cooke (1983), Hammond-Tooke (1983), Nettleton (1984), Willcox (1984, 1987), Woodhouse (1984), and Lewis-Williams and Loubser (1986).

are little used in the Kalahari today (Lee 1968; Marshall 1969:372; Katz 1982:180–81), but there is some suggestion they may have been used more commonly in the past (Dobkin de Rios 1986). Southern San shamans were believed to enter trance to cure the sick, undertake extracorporeal journeys, make rain, and control animals. The artists depicted the trance dance itself, symbols of supernatural potency, hallucinations experienced by shamans, and, most significant for our argument, entoptic phenomena. Although it might have been possible under certain circumstances, we do not suggest that these depictions were executed by people actually in trance. It seems more likely that San shaman-artists recalled and depicted their powerful experiences in relative tranquility. Today the San listen attentively to shamans' recollections of trance experience; in the past, depiction may have been a parallel (but not identical) activity.

For a second assessment of our model we turn to the Shoshonean Coso rock art of the California Great Basin. The paucity of direct ethnographic references to rock art in this area has led some students to believe that its social context is virtually unknowable. By inference from the art alone others have thought it to have been associated with a hunting cult focused on bighorn sheep (Heizer and Baumhoff 1959, 1962; Grant 1968; Ritter 1970). Recently, closer attention to Great Basin and southern Sierra Nevada ethnography has suggested that it was shamanistic (Whitley n.d.a, b; for more on shamanistic rock art in North America see, among others, Kroeber 1925; Grant 1965; Kirkland and Newcomb 1967; Ritter and Ritter 1972a; Vastokas and Vastokas 1973; Hedges 1973, 1976, 1983; Applegate 1975; Blackburn 1977; Lee 1977; Snow 1977; Wellman 1978, 1979a, b; Garvin 1978; Schaafsma 1980; Hudson and Lee 1984). There are many relevant though not direct ethnographic data. Whitley (n.d.a) argues that, if all the references to rock painting within the southern Sierra Nevada area (and across a number of ethnolinguistic groups) "are viewed within the regional patterns of shamanism, a coherent pattern emerges." The most explicit statement was collected by Driver (1937) from a Western Mono informant: "doctors, *po'hage*. . . painted their spirits (*anit*) on rocks 'to show themselves, to let people see what they have done.' The spirit must come first in a dream." Among the Coso Shoshone and other groups (Tubatulabal and Kawaiissu), rock art was ascribed to "water babies," a concept common in the region. Although these mythical creatures have been dismissed as mere "brownies" (Voegelin 1938:61), they were in fact dream or animal helpers of shamans. Moreover, in south-central California there is little lexical difference between "spirit," "dream helper," and "shaman" (Whitley n.d.a, b). Among the adjacent Tubatulabal the "water babies" themselves were identified as the painters and were seen in jimsonweed trances. Although ethnographic evidence for a shamanistic interpretation of Coso rock art is not as rich and varied as that for San rock art, it is sufficient to justify using it in a second, though subsidiary, evaluation of our model.

ENTOPTIC FORMS

In figure 1 we assess the first component of our model, the six entoptic categories, against San and Coso rock art.

In dealing with San art, we distinguish between engravings and paintings because entoptics are, for unknown reasons, considerably more prominent among the former. These two depictive techniques are, by and large, confined to different parts of the subcontinent (Van Riet Lowe 1956), but there is reason to believe they were both employed by San people who entertained similar belief systems (Lewis-Williams and Bieseke 1978; Lewis-Williams 1983c:31–37). Certainly, all six forms occur in both engravings and paintings.

The six entoptic categories are also abundant in Coso art, though not in the same proportions. The first entoptic, a grid, is often part of the enclosed shieldlike forms. Sets of lines (II) are sometimes similarly enclosed, but on one side only. The example in IIE is accompanied by a row of dots (III). Dots, like other forms, are also often depicted enclosed. Zigzags and undulating lines, the fourth entoptic, are as common. Catenary curves (V) seem to be comparatively rare, but examples do exist. The one in figure 1 is accompanied by concentric circles. These circles probably represent a vortex, as is more clearly seen in the depiction next to the example of VI.

We take the presence of all six entoptic forms in both San and Coso art to be an initial confirmation of the utility of our model in explaining one component of these arts.

Figure 2 shows that the six formal categories are depicted in European Upper Palaeolithic art (cf. Eichmeier and Höfer 1974:table 7; Bednarik 1948b:fig. 1). As in the San and Coso cases, many examples have been chosen almost at random and could easily be multiplied. Dots, zigzags, and grids, for instance, are ubiquitous throughout the Upper Palaeolithic. In distinguishing between mobile and parietal art to show that all six categories are found in both, we do not imply that there is an exact correspondence in content between mobile and parietal art. Neither have we attempted to distinguish between periods of the Upper Palaeolithic or geographical regions. Subsequent research will, we feel sure, draw these important distinctions and perhaps suggest social and ritual factors that informed them.

The six categories of figure 2 embrace most but not all Upper Palaeolithic signs. Because the seven principles govern entoptic and iconic mental imagery and because the three stages of our model are not mutually exclusive, the number of possible permutations is high. Among our omissions are spearlike forms, claviforms, and tectiforms (fig. 3). Some of the spearlike signs may well be realistic depictions and thus not relevant to this discussion, but some are marked with zigzags (Marshack 1969: figs. 2b, 33b, 36, 38, 39a). Similarly, some claviforms, such as those at Les Trois-Frères, Niaux, the Apse at Lascaux, and elsewhere (Leroi-Gourhan 1968a:513), may indeed be simplified female forms, as Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:145–46) argues (but see Bahn 1986b). Other clavi-





ENTOPTIC PHENOMENA			SAN ROCK ART		COSO
			ENGRAVINGS	PAINTINGS	
	A	B	C	D	E
I					
II					
III					
IV					
V					
VI					

FIG. 1. Six categories of entoptic phenomena compared with San and Coso rock-art depictions. Redrawn from the following: IA, Siegel (1977:138a); B, Richards (1971:93); C, Thackeray et al. (1981:fig. 3); D, Manhired, Parkinson, and Yates (1985:fig. 4); E, Grant (1968:82); IIA and B, Siegel (1977:138d and c); C, Fock and Fock (1984:fig. 258); D, Pager (1971:fig. 307); E, Grant (1968:102); IIIA and B, Siegel (1977:138b and k); C, Fock (1979:pl. 100); D, Lewis-Williams (1981a:fig. 20); E, Wellmann (1979a:pl. 164); IVA, Siegel (1977:138e); B, Horowitz (1975:fig. 2); C, Fock and Fock (1984:fig. 259); D, Pager (1971:fig. 338); E, Grant (1968:66); VA, Siegel (1977:138j); B, Richards (1971:91b); C, Wilman (1968:pl. 59); D, Lewis-Williams (n.d. b); E, Grant (1968:28); VIA, Horowitz (1975:fig. 2); C, Fock and Fock (1984:fig. 251); D, Lewis-Williams (1981b:fig. 2); E, Grant (1968:101).




















PALAEOLITHIC ART			
MOBILE ART		PARIETAL ART	
F	G	H	I
			
			
			
			
			
			

FIG. 2. Six categories of entoptic phenomena compared with Upper Palaeolithic mobile and parietal art depictions. Redrawn from the following: (I) F, Marshack (1972:fig. 34); G, Marshack (1979:fig. 34); H, Marshack (1985:fig. 17); I, Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:fig. 73); (II) F and G, Marshack (1972:figs. 4 and 36); H and I, Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:figs. 157 and 126); (III) F, Marshack (1972:fig. 12); G, Marshack (1972:fig. 36); H and I, Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:figs. 64 and 165); (IV) F, Marshack (1972:fig. 43); G, Marshack (1972:fig. 200); H and I, Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:figs. 152 and 710); (V) F, Marshack (1979:fig. 29); G, Marshack (1972:fig. 84); H, Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:277); I, Marshack (1977:pl. 45); (VI) F and H, Marshack (1977:pl. 10 and 32).



FIG. 3. Upper Palaeolithic signs not covered by the neuropsychological model. a, spearlike signs superimposed on a horse: Lascaux (after Marshack 1972:fig. 115); b, spearlike signs with zigzags: Polesini (after Marshack 1969:fig. 38); c, claviforms: Villars (after Leroi-Gourhan 1968a:515), Le Gabillou (after Leroi-Gourhan 1968a:515); d, tectiforms: Bernifal (after Leroi-Gourhan 1968a:fig. 33), Font-de-Gaume (after Sieveking 1979:fig. 64b).

forms (e.g., Leroi-Gourhan 1968a:72, 331, 142, 321, 324) are more difficult to account for. Tectiforms are similarly intractable, but those enclosing grids (Sieveking 1979:107) and those rendered in dots (Leroi-Gourhan 1968a:fig. 505, 72) may suggest a connection with entoptic categories I and III. Yet other forms, the convergent nested lines, may represent animal tracks (Delluc and Delluc 1985). More research is required on all these residual forms. In any event, the remaining signs are not numerous, and we believe our classification is more comprehensive than, say, Leroi-Gourhan's (1968a:136–

48), which omits the very numerous zigzags, flecks, filigrees, and festoons. Our omissions are, in fact, a strength rather than a weakness in our argument, because they render invalid the potential criticism that virtually any mark can be interpreted as an entoptic phenomenon.

Even though our six entoptic categories do not account for every Upper Palaeolithic sign, the presence of all six suggests that at least some of the art originated in certain altered states and leads on to the assessment of the other two components of our model.





STAGES AND PRINCIPLES

Because it is impracticable to deal with each of the six categories in all stages in terms of all the principles, we consider a single commonly experienced entoptic phenomenon. In its simplest variant this entoptic (V) is a set of nested catenary curves (cf. Richards 1971; Eichmeier and Höfer 1974:231–35, 255–57, 276, 287–89; Siegel 1977:139). In a more complex form it is a boat-shaped area of invisibility with a flickering, zigzag outer arc (Richards 1971:91). This complex variant can be fragmented into two parts: the navicular area of invisibility and the outer zigzags. It is therefore difficult to be sure if some depicted zigzags derive from this entoptic or from another entoptic that seems to comprise "pure" zigzags (IV). Migraine sufferers, who experience the catenary entoptic, sometimes report only one or other of its two parts, but encouragement to observe it more closely usually results in their perceiving both parts.

By considering just this one entoptic, figure 4 elucidates some of the obscuring transformations and contextualizations that it and other entoptics underwent as, transformed by one or more of the seven principles, they were perceived by shamans in one of the three stages of trance and then rendered on the rock face. The first row illustrates our first principle by showing replicated depictions of this entoptic phenomenon. The San example is one of a series of red boat-shaped depictions (Maggs and Sealy 1983). Here the navicular form comprises four curves and a peripheral zigzag (cf. fig. 1, VB). In Coso art nested curves like these are uncommon, and the example in figure 4 is exceptional. Zigzag and undulating lines are more common.

The second row gives examples of fragmentation, each of which shows the zigzag broken down into chevrons. The San example is a set of chevrons. The containing line around such forms (see also the Coso example in the third row) may be entoptic, for Klüver (1942:177) noted "boundaries" of "lines so thin that it may be impossible

FIG. 4. Entoptic phenomena in the three stages of altered stages of consciousness as depicted in San, Coso, and Upper Palaeolithic art. I, replications; II, fragmentations; III, integrations; IV, construals; V, integrations with animals; VI, integrations with human figures. Redrawn from the following: I, Maggs and Sealy (1983:fig. 5), Grant (1968:64), Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:304); II, Marshack (1972:fig. 16); III, Grant (1968:107a), Marshack (1979:fig. 35); IV, Pager (1971:fig. 387, 8b), Grant (1986:211), Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:fig. 27); V, Grant (1968:63), Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:632); VI, Lewis-Williams (1986a:fig. 3c), Grant (1968:69) and Ritter and Ritter (1972b:pl. 4), Marshack (1976:fig. 4), and Leroi-Gourhan (1968a:fig. 58).

		SAN	COSO	PALAEOLITHIC
STAGE 1 ENTOPTICS	I			
	II			
	III			
STAGE 2 CONSTRUAL	IV			
STAGE 3 ENTOPTICS AND ICONICS	V			
	VI			

to say whether they are black or white." The Coso example is similar but lacks the containing lines. Another example of fragmentation is IC of figure 1, a form that in some expressions is very like what we understand by a ladder and in others has more than two long lines or only one and a number of equal or unequal transverse lines.

The third row illustrates the integration of two entoptic phenomena. The San depiction integrates grids and a zigzag, by filling in one side of the zigzag with grids a series of triangles results. The Coso example is one of a series that has been interpreted as shields.

All the depictions so far discussed are purely entoptic. In the next stage of altered states subjects try to make sense of their mental images. For example, during the period of his training a Samoyed shaman is encouraged to "guess" what each element of his vision represents (Siikala 1985). This "guessing" is, of course, not random but constrained by the shaman's tradition and by what he is expected or desires to see.

Sometimes very little manipulation of an image is required to give it an iconic referent, but in more complex construals the entoptic raw material may be swamped by iconic elaborations. The San example in the fourth row, however, affords a nice balance between entoptic and iconic elements. In the wild, honeycombs often assume the form of nested catenary curves (Pager 1971: 151), and the accompanying bees in numerous painted examples of such curves suggest that a shaman interpreted the entoptic as a honeycomb (Lewis-Williams n.d.b). This is because bees are, for the San, a potent symbol of the supernatural power shamans harness to enter trance. This construal of catenary curves was thus controlled by beliefs about trance performance and was probably also encouraged by a buzzing in the ears experienced in certain altered states (Harner 1973:119; Munn 1973:119; Christie-Murray 1978; Bootzin 1980:343; Halifax 1980:49, 144). Other San artists appear to have construed the same entoptic in different ways (for more on southern African construals, see Lewis-Williams n.d.b); the U-shapes on "decorated handprints," for example, probably represent the physical sensation of tingling in the hands reported by 19th-century San shamans (cf. Bleek and Lloyd MS L.V.4.4224, Jagger Library, University of Cape Town; see Wellmann 1979a:fig. 423 and Schaafsma 1980:119, pl. 11 for similar decorated handprints in Arizona).

Another interesting San example of construal is IVD of figure 1. Here a zigzag has been transformed into one of the buck-headed serpents that occur widely in San rock art; the blood falling from the noses of many such serpents (e.g., Lewis-Williams 1981a:fig. 23; Johnson and Maggs 1979:fig. 51) links them to shamans, for southern San shamans frequently suffered a nasal haemorrhage when they entered trance (Lewis-Williams 1981a:75-101). Snakes are also analogous to San shamans in that they go underground and then surface elsewhere as shamans do when they are on out-of-body travel (Bieseke 1980). A somewhat different San construal is the flecks surrounding the dancer in IIID (for full panel, see Lewis-Williams 1981a:fig. 20). San sha-

mans believe the place where a trance dance is performed to be redolent with potency that can be seen only by people in trance. We suggest that flickering dot and fleck entoptics (III) were sometimes construed as that potency and then depicted here and in numerous other more clearly hallucinatory scenes (e.g., Vinnicombe 1976:figs. 239, 240).

In each of these San examples an entoptic has been construed as an element in the complex of shamanistic beliefs. Two of the examples, nested catenary curves as honeycombs and a zigzag as a snake, both construe entoptics as items from the "real" world, though the snake has a buck head. The third is different because the artists construed an entoptic as something (supernatural potency) that exists in belief only.

In contrast to the San construal, the Coso example, the bighorn sheep so characteristic of this art (Wellmann 1979a:figs. 173-80), is of the more complex version of the entoptic. The curved horns recall the simple form, but the body is an entoptic boat shape to which head, legs, and tail have been added. The placing of animal legs on the arc, also done by some San artists (fig. 1, VD), suggests that the flickering margin of the arc may have been construed as the flashing legs of galloping animals (Lewis-Williams n.d.b). Moreover, at a number of Coso sites the heads of bighorn sheep and antlered deer have been added to identical navicular bodies, and in at least two cases a navicular body has been given two heads (Grant 1968:68; Wellmann 1979a:fig. 180). The body was a basic entoptic "given" that could be turned into more than one species. One particularly instructive Coso composition shows bighorn sheep with an antlered deer (fig. 5a). Two of the sheep are linked by a non-realistic line (cf. Lewis-Williams 1981b), another suggestion that these pictures should not be seen "real-




FIG. 5. Construed entoptic phenomena from Coso. a, antlered deer and bighorn sheep with navicular bodies: Coso Peak No. 2 (after Grant 1968:98); b, non-realistic line linking bighorn sheep and three sets of horns: Sheep Canyon (after Grant 1968:72).

istically." In an even more clearly hallucinatory composition a similar line joins three sheep and then runs off to at least two sets of horns as seen from the front (fig. 5b). In two cases the line becomes one of the curving horns, and in another the horns sprout from the line. One site has 82 head-on pairs of horns, some of which have the head and ears as well (Grant 1968:12). The line itself may derive from Entoptic VI (cf. VID in fig. 1).

In the final stage of altered states of consciousness, iconic elements are spontaneous rather than construals. For convenience we have divided this stage into two parts. The first, exemplified in the fifth row, comprises entoptic phenomena combined with animals, and the second, in the sixth row, introduces the human figure. The San example of the integration of entoptics with animals has traditionally been seen as a poor attempt to draw a zebra, but the quadruped is part of a large composition that includes two well-delineated "rain-animals" (Lewis-Williams 1981a:103-16) and many zigzags (for full panel see Lewis-Williams 1987a:fig. 5). Rather than poor draughtsmanship, a failing seldom evident in San rock art, this painting is an instance of the integration of a fragmented entoptic (chevrons) and iconic imagery. Generally, entoptics in San rock paintings are not immediately evident because incorporation is so intimately achieved. In the Coso example an iconic lizard is juxtaposed with a zigzag. Such zigzags, a common feature of North American rock art, seem sometimes to have been construed as snakes.

All the visual experiences we have described so far are witnessed, as it were, from outside, but at peak hallucinatory periods subjects begin to feel dissociated from their bodies and frequently become part of their own imagery (Siegel 1977:136; Siegel and Jarvik 1975:128). In this climactic period, images are fantastically combined, and the subject inhabits rather than merely witnesses a bizarre hallucinatory world. We call this condition *participation* and illustrate it in the last row. Some rock-art depictions of human beings probably represent participation, but we must allow that it would be difficult to distinguish between images of the subject himself and images of other persons he might encounter in his altered state of consciousness.

The San example of what may be participation introduces another important dimension in the perception and depiction of entoptic phenomena for which San beliefs about trance experience offer an explanation. When a San shaman enters trance, his or her legs and arms tremble. At the same time a painful sensation in the stomach is ascribed to the "boiling" of supernatural potency. When the boiling potency rises up the spine to the head, the shaman succumbs and enters deep trance. Katz (1982:236) believes that this rising and boiling sensation is represented by the spirals and zigzags drawn by shamans whom he asked to draw themselves. By contrast, people who had never entered trance drew simple stick figures. Although Katz does not himself make the point, it seems probable that the shamans were depicting entoptic phenomena which, because of their shimmering,

are analogous to trembling and boiling potency. In other words, they believed themselves to be what they saw (Lewis-Williams 1986a). Katz's work leads us to suppose that the zigzag legs of the San depiction in the last row represent a similar process in which somatic trembling was represented by visual zigzags. Such confusion of the senses, synesthesia, is a fairly common feature of altered states of consciousness; a touch on the skin, for example, may feel blue (Klüver 1942:199; Fischer 1975:222; La Barre 1975:10; Emboden 1979:44). Serko (cited by Klüver 1942:181), in a report that recalls the San painting of a man with zigzag legs, said he felt his legs consisted of "spirals" and that these somatic spirals blended with a luminous spiral rotating in the visual field: "One has the sensation of somatic and optic unity." Another subject reported that he became identical with an entoptic "fretwork" pattern as his arms, hands, and fingers turned into fretwork: "The fretwork is I" (Berenger, cited by Klüver 1942:182).

Similar confusion of the senses probably accounts for the entoptic patterns integrated into the rectangular Coso anthropomorphs (see also Wellmann 1979a:figs. 195-201; Hedges 1982:fig. 5). The astonishing variety of patterns in these figures may represent beliefs about personal internal power (Hedges 1982:6) rather than ornate garments, as has been suggested (e.g., Grant 1968:39). This point will be clarified when North American ethnography is more intensively deployed in interpreting the rock art of the continent.

Identification of such Stage 3 rock-art depictions incorporating entoptics with hallucinatory iconic percepts faces serious problems. In Stage 1, entoptic phenomena, projected onto external objects, may be so strong as to inform perception of those objects. Klüver (1942:178) cites one of Berenger's subjects, who, looking at a small branch, said, "The leaves . . . suddenly appeared in an ornamental pattern as if joined in a circular design having the form of approximately a cobweb. I looked at other branches, and, looking at them, all leaves assumed the same lattice-like arrangement." Stage 1 pseudo-incorporations, as we shall call them, thus incorporate entoptic with perceptual elements, whereas Stage 3 incorporations do not have a perceptual component. Further research may distinguish between pseudo-incorporations and Stage 3 incorporations, but for the present we must be alert to potential confusion.

So far we have shown that the stages and principles of our model clarify and order depictions in both San and Coso art. Fuller discussion of a range of entoptics and their almost infinite transformations, contextualisations, and variations would be repetitious. Perusal of the San and Coso literature will demonstrate the effective range of the model. Because these other two components of our model have proved appropriate to these known shamanistic arts, confidence in its efficacy as an explanation for an important component of Upper Palaeolithic art increases. The next part of this explanation is illustrated in the Upper Palaeolithic column of figure 4.

In contrast to the San and Coso depictions, the European example of replication is of a simpler variation of

the entoptic—unadorned catenary curves. In Upper Palaeolithic art such curves are usually further developed by reduplication to form a festoon (fig. 2, VI) or symmetrically inverted (VG).

The second Upper Palaeolithic example is particularly interesting because it illustrates the process of fragmentation (cf. Leroi-Gourhan's [1982] "abbreviation"). On this engraved pebble are a zigzag line, a set of overlapping chevrons which form, in effect, a zigzag, and a number of discrete chevrons. The derivation of the chevrons from the continuous zigzag line seems clear, though we do not, of course, imply that the artists did not discriminate semantically between the replicated and the fragmented expressions.

The next example illustrates juxtapositioning: a grid has been placed next to a series of zigzags (cf. Sauvet, Sauvet, and Włodarczyk 1977:551). This is a less intimate way of combining images than the integrations from the San and Coso arts.

Upper Palaeolithic examples of Stage 2 are more difficult to identify. We do, however, tentatively suggest that the exaggerated curved ibex horns with a zigzag outer margin at Niaux (in the fourth row here) and the equally exaggerated horns of the ibex engraved on the La Mouthe lamp (Graziosi 1960:pl. 113) are probably construals. Another instance may be the mammoths of Rouffignac. A salient feature of these paintings and engravings is the nested, curved tusks. To these curves has been added a dorsal line; the rest of the mammoth is often exiguously depicted. Many have superimposed zigzags and undulations (Graziosi 1960:pls. 148, 149). The Rouffignac mammoths may also exemplify reduplication, for some are depicted in lines, the curved tusks being a prominent repeated motif (cf. unconstrued reduplicated U-shapes in fig. 2, VI). Another Upper Palaeolithic example may be the line of horses' heads that Leroi-Gourhan (1982:fig. 3) believes were reduced to a zigzag line. If there is any association at all, we suggest the opposite to be more likely: a zigzag was interpreted as the heads of a line of galloping horses, the movement of the heads being analogous to flickering entoptic zigzags. Further reduplications and construals may be the ibex heads at Lascaux (Graziosi 1960:pl. 194b) and the reindeer at La Mairie à Teyjat (Graziosi 1960:pl. 89e). These suggestions are tentative, but as Upper Palaeolithic research of the kind we advocate proceeds, we expect examples as convincing as the San and Coso ones to come to light.

In Stage 3 the Upper Palaeolithic example of an entoptic combined with an animal is like the San one in that zigzags have been superimposed on an animal (or vice versa), but it poses problems of association because one cannot be sure, in the confused cluster of engravings of which it is part, that an artist intended this exact relationship. The entoptic may have been done at a different time from the iconic, but this is not, of course, sufficient reason to suppose that an association was not intended. An instructive example of intentional addition of entoptic elements to an iconic image is the horse frieze at Pech Merle (fig. 2, IIIH). Infrared analysis has indicated that the horses were originally empty outlines

and that red and black dots and other forms were added in sets (Marshack 1985:102–3). When the space within and around the first horse was exhausted, a second outline was painted, and it too was filled with dots. The time lapse between the additions is not known. Although we cannot always be sure if such associated entoptic and iconic representations are part of a single vision and depiction, the combination of the two kinds of image was suggested and made acceptable by the experiences of altered states of consciousness. In contrast to such cases, the bison executed in dots at Marsoulas (Graziosi 1960:pl. 213b) and the dotted outlines of animals at Covalanas (pls. 230b, 231d, e, 232c, e) are more clearly depictions of visions that combined entoptic and iconic elements.

The first Upper Palaeolithic example of integration with a human figure is comparable to the San and Coso depictions because it shows zigzags superimposed on a human figure. The striking universality of this combination, whether by integration or superposition, is further evidence for somatic and visual synesthesia operating in similar ways in different cultures. The second example not only juxtaposes entoptic and iconic images but also integrates two iconic images, human and animal, in a single therianthrope figure. Hallucinations integrating human beings with animals are fairly common. Klüver (1926:505) recounts his own hallucination of a human head acquiring the hair of a cat and then becoming a cat's head. A more vivid and complete transformation was described by one of James's subjects: "I thought of a fox, and instantly I was transformed into that animal. I could distinctly feel myself a fox, could see my long ears and bushy tail, and by a sort of introversion felt that my complete anatomy was that of a fox" (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:105). In Europe and in southern Africa, painted and engraved therianthropes have been interpreted as hunters or shamans wearing masks. In southern Africa, a lack of ethnographic support for hunting masks (Pager 1975a) and numerous non-realistic painted features such as hoofs, long streamers emanating from the shoulders, and flywhisks protruding from the shoulders or head suggest that therianthropes are hallucinatory rather than realistic paintings (Lewis-Williams 1981a:75–102). Although we allow that, in certain rituals, Upper Palaeolithic people may have attached antlers or horns to their heads, we argue that the Palaeolithic therianthropes are also better explained by hallucination than ritual costume because they, like the southern African ones, have clearly non-realistic features. Indeed, we reject the notion that "primitive mentality . . . failed to establish definitive boundaries between humans and animals" (Graziosi 1960:34) and suggest that the rather unlikely concept of a half-man/half-animal was initially presented to early people by the nervous system as, in altered states, it integrated different iconic images. The therianthrope in figure 4 thus probably represents a shaman participating in and integrated with his own visual imagery.

We can now summarize our assessment of the utility of the neuropsychological model in elucidating a signi-

ficant component of Upper Palaeolithic art. In figure 1 we showed that a set of entoptic forms occurs in San and Coso shamanistic art. In figure 4 we demonstrated the applicability of the second and third components of the model to the same arts. We argue that the model exposes the neuropsychological order underlying the seemingly chaotic integrated, superimposed, juxtaposed, fragmented, and reduplicated iconic and geometric depictions of these two arts. Far from being anarchic, San and Coso art are ordered products of identifiable stages of altered consciousness and neurologically based principles in the formation of mental imagery. The painted and engraved images are, in fact, informed by the functioning of the human nervous system in altered states. Because the order that results is different from the order Westerners are predisposed to seek in artistic creations, it has escaped notice.

We have also applied the model to Upper Palaeolithic art (figs. 2 and 4) and shown that it is as appropriate here as it is to the two known shamanistic arts. In doing so, we emphasise that we take into account a large number of features; a single zigzag, for instance, would not in itself be persuasive evidence for an entoptic component. There is thus a strong suggestion that at least a significant component of Upper Palaeolithic art also derives from altered states of consciousness and that many of the signs depict entoptic phenomena in the various transformations we have described. Because our entoptic categories, principles of apprehension, and stages of altered states are established by independent neuropsychological research and not derived from the art itself, our model greatly reduces the inferential component that looms so large in many arguments about Upper Palaeolithic art that try to avoid ethnographic analogy.

We do not argue that San and Upper Palaeolithic religions were identical or any similar simplicity. All that the parallels exhibited here allow us to conclude at the moment is an association with altered states and, further, because shamanism is so pervasively associated with foraging societies, that in the Upper Palaeolithic this association probably had at least some features in common with what we understand by shamanism. We are, of course, by no means the first to suggest that shamanism in some form existed in the Upper Palaeolithic (see, among others, Lommel 1967; La Barre 1970, 1972; Eliade 1972; Eichmeier and Höfer 1974; Furst 1976; Halifax 1980:3, 17; 1982; Pfeiffer 1982; Bednarik 1984a, 1986). We simply strengthen this hypothesis by developing a neuropsychological model that reveals the order in two shamanistic arts and provides a more secure way of addressing Upper Palaeolithic art.

Implications

The depiction of entoptic phenomena in Upper Palaeolithic art invites reflection on many issues. For the moment we select only four for brief comment: the meaning of entoptic elements; the depiction of entoptic

phenomena on Upper Palaeolithic artefacts and in deep caverns; the co-occurrence of geometric and iconic elements; and, finally, the origins of representational art.

As we suggested at the beginning of this paper, meaning is a question writers now tend to shy away from; we too offer only tentative and cautionary observations. To begin with, it must be said that entoptic phenomena doubtless had different meanings and associations in different times and places and even for different artists within a single society. The San artists' construal of Entoptic V as honeycombs, antelope legs along an arc, and other forms suggests some idiosyncrasy. But, because even these various construals all derive from specific San beliefs about trance, we believe that, whether replicated, fragmented, integrated, superimposed, juxtaposed, or reduplicated, entoptic phenomena probably had a restricted range of specific meanings. Even novel construals would have been intelligible to San viewers because they would have been constrained by and located within the belief structure of San shamanism. Similarly, because we now know the provenance of Upper Palaeolithic signs, their interpretations are no longer, in George Eliot's phrase, "illimitable."

The Tukano go further than the San and provide a potential clue to one aspect of the significance of the selection and repetition of entoptic phenomena in Upper Palaeolithic art, a clue that may suggest another dimension to Conkey's (1980) work on Upper Palaeolithic design elements, some of which are clearly entoptic in form (cf. Eichmeier and Höfer 1974:table 7). Each exogamic Tukano group considers itself to "own" a certain type of vision (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a:4, 9). These socially distinguishing visions are associated with different kinds of *yajé*: the Desana, for example, "own" at least four named kinds of *yajé*, the southern Barasana three kinds. Some kinds of *yajé* are, in turn, linked to animals. The Tukano themselves say that their shamans use "fish *yajé*" to contact the Master of the Animals, while the Barasana of the Pira-Paraná recognize "*yajé* of the red jaguar" and "*yajé* of the jungle animals" (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1972:97).

In discussing the cultivation of such visions in shamanism, Noll (1985:445–46) identifies two goals of shamanistic training that are relevant to the Tukano experience. Novices learn to increase the vividness of their imagery, and they learn to control the content of their visions by "actively engaging and manipulating the visionary phenomena." As part of the second skill we suggest the cultivation of specific entoptic images. Because expectation sharpens perception, certain entoptics tend to be perceived at the expense of others, and a social group thus develops a characteristic repertoire of formalised, codified entoptics. The response of a laboratory subject asked to draw his entoptic percepts after a lapse of time may give some clue to the processes whereby entoptic phenomena become standardised (Knoll et al. 1963:208–12). After a period of 5–26 days, the subject tended to produce more elaborate and better-defined depictions than those done during the experiment. After five months, he produced what he considered to be even

more generalised depictions rather than specific pictures.

Moreover, specific entoptic phenomena can repeat themselves as afterimages for up to six months and "can appear in the visual field at any instant when they are triggered off by a change in body chemistry or an external stimulus" (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978b:298). These afterimages are superimposed on normal vision in otherwise ordinary daily experience. "The particular spectrum of [entoptic phenomena], together with their cultural interpretations, can be said to accompany the person in a permanent manner" (pp. 298-99). Regional differences in Upper Palaeolithic iconic and entoptic iconography may thus have arisen from different expectations and standardisations of visions and afterimages. That such visions would have had social implications, as they do for the Tukano, is highly probable. A more specific statement is currently impossible, but the cultivation of mental images leads to our second question—the location of so much Upper Palaeolithic art in deep caverns.

To approach this problem we again turn to southern Africa. The supernatural potency that San shamans activate to enter trance is named after powerful animals and things, supreme among which is the eland (Lewis-Williams and Bieseke 1978, Lewis-Williams 1981a). The eland is also the most frequently depicted antelope in many regions (Maggs 1967; Vinnicombe 1972, 1976; Lewis-Williams 1972, 1974, 1981a; Pager 1971), and part of the function of these depictions was recently explained by an old woman, probably the last survivor of the southern San (Jolly 1986, Lewis-Williams 1986b). She demonstrated how dancers seeking power turned to face the paintings on the wall of the rock-shelter and how some people placed their hands on the paintings of eland to gain power. The paintings, she said, had been put there by shamans and contained power. Although this incident took place in an open rock-shelter and not in a dark cavern, there is an important potential parallel with Upper Palaeolithic art: depictions are both a result of visions (as the presence of entoptics, integrations, fragmentations, and other features shows) and a factor in inducing or at any rate informing them. Both situations may have obtained in the Upper Palaeolithic caverns.

The sensory deprivation experienced in such places induces entoptic phenomena, as Walker (1981:146) reports from his own experience, and also hallucinations (e.g., La Barre 1975:14; Pfeiffer 1982:211; Siegel 1984). Aspirant shamans seeking visions to give them access to the spirit world frequently meditate in remote places, often caves (Eliade 1972:50-51, 110-14; Halifax 1980:6), and Hultkrantz (1981:39, 40) records Shoshone shamans' seeking visions at rock-art sites. Under laboratory conditions, a subject asked to turn his or her attention inward to entoptic phenomena becomes absorbed in the experience, and "typical signs of trance state (immobility, slow regular breathing, etc.) become evident" (Hunchak 1980:223). Prehistoric people, isolated in dark caverns and expectantly scrutinizing their entoptic phenomena in the hope of seeing specific forms, would similarly have induced an altered state. It is thus possible that the

painted caves of Western Europe provided circumstances especially conducive to the generation of entoptic phenomena and hallucinations.

Locations like the small "sanctuary" in La Pileta come to mind: "The entrance is a few feet from the floor, and one has to climb up and crawl in. It is only a few feet high and long, and it is necessary to kneel or squat inside" (Marshack 1977:287-89). Although there is no room for communal activity, the vast number of marks on the clay wall of this "sanctuary" suggests, as Marshack notes, that it has been repeatedly touched. Some simple iconic depictions, entoptics, and finger flutings (Anati 1981; Bednarik 1948a, b, 1986) swiftly executed in the soft surface of the walls of such locations may have been made by novices who, having entered the caverns on a vision quest, reached out to the existing depictions to absorb their power and to trace their own visual percepts during or after their altered state of consciousness. Significantly, the less accessible parts of caves such as Les Trois Frères, Lascaux, Altamira, and Niaux contain simpler and more fragmented figures; more detailed depictions tend to be nearer the entrance (Lorblanchet 1977:53). If certain remote locations became known as "powerful" places where visions could be obtained, such depictions would accumulate there.

An interesting addendum to this explanation for remote locations is the placing of many depictions of felines and other dangerous animals in the depths of the caverns. Writers have argued that much of what Leroi-Gourhan proposes about the distribution of paintings in the caves does not stand up to scrutiny (Ucko and Rosenfeld 1967:195-221; Stevens 1975), but the placing of many dangerous animals in the remote chambers and passages does seem acceptable (Parkington 1969). It is certainly possible that the greater depths would have induced greater dread and that shamans and novices would therefore have tended to hallucinate dangerous creatures. In many cases the remote parts seem to have been visited rarely or, perhaps, only once for the execution of art.

On the other hand, large painted galleries were probably the location of more elaborate rituals involving a number of people—as is suggested by the remains of scaffolding (Leroi-Gourhan and Allain 1979, Ruspoli 1987). These communally produced images should be seen in contrast to (but certainly not to the exclusion of) those that could have been the work of a few moments. The communally constructed galleries may have been vestibules where novices absorbed the power of imposing and sometimes ritually renewed depictions before venturing farther into the caves or being left alone for their personal quest. The array of depictions that prepared them for what they were about to see comprised entoptics, therianthropes, and "powerful" animals of the kind they hoped to hallucinate. These animals, we suggest, were, at least on one level, the spirit helpers from whom shamans obtained power. Technique of depiction and location in the caverns thus suggest distinct though related ritual components.

But not all Upper Palaeolithic art is in locations implying arcane activities and experiences. The presence of

similar but not an identical range of depictions on artefacts has sometimes been contrasted with hidden locations to suggest a parallel "secular" artistic tradition. Whatever the differences between mobile and parietal art (differences that should be explored in terms of the stages and principles outlined here), the simple presence of entoptics in both contexts suggest an embracing unity. Notwithstanding Conkey's (1983) sensible observations, elucidation of that unity must precede elucidation of distinctions; the differences must be subsumed under the unity rather than seen as vitiating it. The presence of entoptic phenomena on mobile art suggests that, although the experiences of the caverns may have been in some sense hieratic, elements of the visions there obtained were also demotic. Free access to visions is indeed characteristic of the Tukano; they depict their entoptic percepts on house walls, ceramics, bark cloth, gourd rattles, stamping tubes, and basketwork (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a, b). The user or beholder of an artefact with these designs is continually reminded of their message—as the San inhabitants of a painted rock-shelter must have been continually aware of the "other" world. Upper Palaeolithic people too were thus reminded of the large body of shamanistic lore and social norms encoded in entoptic designs on artefacts.

In the caverns and on mobile pieces entoptic phenomena are frequently accompanied by iconic depictions. Their co-occurrence in single "compositions" or, for that matter, during a single cultural period has been one of the central puzzles of Upper Palaeolithic art. Marshack (1977) and others, denying an evolutionary link, see the two forms as parallel graphic systems. This judgment may be correct in a general way, but it does not explain why early man and the makers of so many rock arts around the world maintained two graphic systems. The answer to this problem is not that man invented and purposefully maintained two parallel or complementary systems but that the structure of the human nervous system produces these two kinds of image. The "naturalness" of combining them was well illustrated by Reichel-Dolmatoff's (1978a) informants when he asked them to draw what they saw under the influence of *yajé*; as on their artefacts, entoptic and iconic elements were mixed. In Upper Palaeolithic Western Europe, southern Africa, the Great Basin, and elsewhere, entoptic phenomena were intentionally associated with iconic images simply because that is the way the human visual system works; the association is intrinsic to altered states of consciousness.

The universality of the association between entoptic and iconic elements is a clue to the answer to our final question: how did people come to realise that two-dimensional marks could represent three-dimensional objects? The early view that representational art grew out of non-representational, self-sufficient marks, once discredited, has recently been cogently reargued by Davis (1986a). He does not believe that representational art evolved out of the formal "signs," suggesting instead that it evolved out of chance or random marks. Sooner or later, he argues, as a result of the perceptual ambiguity of natural marks and features, early people would have

tumbled to a likeness between their own and naturally formed marks and some object in nature. "Continually marking the world will continually increase the probability that marks will be seen as things" (Davis 1986a:200). In contrast to this view, we argue that the answer lies in the operation of the human nervous system in altered states. Klüver (1926:505, 506; see also Knoll et al. 1963:208) found, from his own experience, that both entoptic phenomena and iconic hallucinations seemed to be localised on the walls or the ceiling. Szuman (cited by Siegel and Jarvik 1975:109) described this experience as "pictures painted before your imagination," and Siegel (1977:134) likened it to "a motion picture or a slide show." Klüver (1942:179) also found that entoptic images recurred after he had awakened from an altered state and that they were then projected onto the ceiling. The Tukano too experience their entoptic images projected onto plane surfaces, and, as afterimages, they may recur in this way for several months (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a:8).

Such reports suggest that early people similarly experienced mental imagery and afterimages projected onto their surroundings. Their surroundings were thus already invested with "pictures." Because altered states of consciousness produce iconic images that are "completely disengaged from any kind of natural surroundings" and are perceived "without regard to size or position relative to one another," as well as distorted and geometric percepts, and, further, because these images, as they are projected onto a wall, attain their "own free-floating existence, independent of scene or surface" (Halverson's [1987:66, 67] phrases to describe Palaeolithic art), early people were neurologically provided with the salient features of Upper Palaeolithic art. They did not have to "invent drawing," as Delluc and Delluc (1986) suggest. Tracing projected mental images with a finger in the sand or on the soft wall of a cave to experience them more fully would have "fixed" them and would have been an initial step in the history of art. They were merely touching and marking *what was already there*. The first depictions were thus not two-dimensional representations of three- (even four-) dimensional reality. Rather, they were "fixed" mental images. In all probability their makers did not suppose that they stood for "real" animals any more than the accompanying entoptic depictions represented (iconically) things in the real world. It is, furthermore, possible that, for their makers, the earliest depictions *were* visual images: hallucinations and depictions were one. The social circumstances in which mental images that had been experienced for millennia came to be fixed will clearly require elucidation; the images must have acquired a significance that caused people to reach out to touch and fix them.⁵

This is not to say that all Upper Palaeolithic depictions are images fixed by people in altered states or expe-

5. It is worth noting that the possible tracing of eidetic imagery in the Upper Palaeolithic has been discussed (for an overview, see Kubler 1985), but we believe the presence of entoptic elements suggests the imagery of altered states rather than eidetic imagery.

riencing afterimages. Once that initial step had been taken, the development of Upper Palaeolithic art probably followed three courses. One stream remained mental imagery fixed while it was being experienced. A second stream derived from recollected mental imagery processed in the ways we have suggested. A third stream derived from contemplation of the graphic products of the first two streams and the realization that they could be duplicated even by someone who had never experienced an altered state of consciousness. Beliefs about mental imagery and its fixing doubtless changed through the Upper Palaeolithic, but the continued association of entoptic phenomena suggests that even these third-stream depictions, in a sense the most realistic pieces of Palaeolithic art, were also understood as fixed images from the world of altered consciousness, even though some were socially produced. The accurately delineated animals of San art show that realism is not incompatible with the imagery of altered states.

Because altered states persisted throughout the Upper Palaeolithic (and, of course, beyond), the products of these three streams were variously interwoven in different periods and places. The "style" of any period is thus much more than the manner in which people reduced real objects; it is a complex mix of or, perhaps, balance between fixed mental images and afterimages, codified recollections of these images, and independently created representations of entoptic and extrasomatic subjects. Moreover, because the action of fixing the images would have been the same for entoptic phenomena and iconic hallucinations, there is no need to postulate different origins or a genetic relationship between Upper Palaeolithic signs and representational art. Both signs and iconic representations are "realistic" in that they both depict what people "really" experienced. If we are correct in this economical explanation, we must accept that the projection of geometric and iconic imagery was part of humankind's experience throughout the Palaeolithic and in all parts of the world. Like Davis (1986b:515), but for different reasons, we believe that depiction had (perhaps still has) many independent origins.

The very earliest markings are, however, geometric rather than iconic. An engraved bone from Pech de l'Azé has been dated to the Acheulian, ca. 300,000 B.P. (Bordes 1969). Marshack's (1977:291) microscopic examination of the piece showed that the "central form consists of a hanging 'scallop' image." The design (fig. 6a; cf. fig. 2, VI) in fact comprises a series of chevrons and two overlapping reduplicated U shapes. Another complex image—a set of double zigzags (Marshack 1976:fig. 7)—is engraved on a Mousterian bone fragment (fig. 6b). Marshack (1977) traces the zigzag/meander from these early beginnings to a number of Upper Palaeolithic sites where it is sometimes associated with representational images. He considers these "festooned or serpentine images" to be "the most prevalent motif of the Upper Palaeolithic" (Marshack 1976:278). We believe that he is correct in identifying the longevity and ubiquity of the zigzag/meander and the overlapping U shapes; we, however, ascribe the persistence of the forms not, as he does,




FIG. 6. Engraved entoptic phenomena dated to periods earlier than Upper Palaeolithic. a, Acheulian: engraved bone from Pech de l'Azé (after Marshack 1977: pls. 2 and 6b); b, Mousterian: engraved bone from Bacho Kiro, Bulgaria (after Marshack 1976:fig. 7c).

to a continuing symbol tradition but to the antiquity of the human nervous system and its generation of entoptic phenomena. We thus agree with Gamble (1983:203) that bones can be scratched intentionally without this implying a symbolic act; we simply go further by pointing to the origin of the specific forms. Another form occurs later, in the Châtelperronian—sets of parallel lines (cf. fig. 2, second row) that, according to Delluc and Delluc (1986), "seem to play, from the beginning, the role of the geometric signs." We argue that parallel lines (fig. 1, II) are "geometric signs."

In the light of these observations, the fragmentary nature of Aurignacian iconic representations (Delluc and Delluc 1978) is less enigmatic.⁶ As we have seen, both entoptic and iconic mental imagery is subject to fragmentation. It seems that, in the early millennia of image control and fixing, artists fixed fragmented hallucinations. These Aurignacian depictions are not necessarily metonymic abstractions; they are more probably fragmented hallucinations depicted in their entirety. The trajectory from these fragmentations to the complex Magdalenian iconic representations should be seen not as a striving for greater reality or indeed in any direct relation to the real world but rather in relation to the real world as mediated by the human nervous system in altered states. Throughout the Upper Palaeolithic, mental imagery remained the same; what people made of it changed through time. Art did not "evolve" cumulatively and uniformly through the Upper Palaeolithic. In fact, we explicitly reject Upper Palaeolithic social and artistic homogeneity and a unilinear trajectory (cf. Bahn 1978:125; Conkey 1983, 1984, n.d.; Jochim 1983). We see our position as preparatory to the elucidation of syn-

6. Our account omits discussion of pieces in the round, such as the Vogelherd horses (Marshack 1976), some of which are marked with entoptic forms.

chronic and diachronic variability. The stages of altered consciousness and the principles of perception we have adumbrated are analytical tools for addressing this complexity.

At one point between the Acheulian and the Magdalenian, the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic, there was an intensification of production, an apparent increase in the artists' entoptic repertoire, the addition of representational images, and, quite possibly, a new desire for durable depictions (Conkey 1983:213-14). The few very early examples of engraved entoptic phenomena suggest that this intensification was not the result of changes in the human brain and nervous system. Rather, social circumstances changed, and in these new circumstances mental imagery, its projection and fixing, achieved new significance. Probably, new social forms (see, for example, Conkey 1980, 1984; Gamble 1980, 1982, 1983; Faris 1983; Gilman 1984; White 1985) provided a niche for an experience and associated practice that had its roots deep in the past.

Comments

PAUL G. BAHN

428 Anlaby Rd., Hull HU3 6QP, England. 26 VIII 87

As one who greatly admires Lewis-Williams's work and his contribution to the way we think about rock art and its possible meanings, I greatly enjoyed this paper. It may well provide some long-needed insight into what lies behind some of the "signs" of the Upper Palaeolithic. However, I intend to play devil's advocate here and voice some points on which I would welcome clarification.

First, I wonder if the answer is not being brought at the same time as (or even before) the question. The recent appearance of phosphenes in papers on Palaeolithic art has certainly opened up fresh avenues of thought but also incorporates a number of assumptions and truisms. Being totally ignorant of the nonarchaeological literature on the topic, I would like to know how well established the claim is that these things are truly universal. Have they been recorded in every human group in existence, or merely in a few sample populations scattered around the globe? Even if they are truly universal today, one still has to make the considerable assumption that the very first members of our subspecies, 30,000 years ago, had the same hallucinations as modern people. The authors themselves point out that the content of early human imagery must have been greatly influenced by cultural expectations, which were surely different to ours.

Tautology is difficult to avoid in prehistoric art studies, and we appear to have a degree of it here: the simpler Palaeolithic signs are assumed to be hallucinated images, from which it is claimed that these entoptic phe-

nomena were the same then as now, and this is proved by the shapes of the ancient signs.

Ethnographic analogy is equally difficult to eschew—even Leroi-Gourhan's approach relied heavily on the assumption that Palaeolithic people thought like 20th-century French structuralists. Where truly universal phenomena are concerned, one is on safer ground; I tried this myself in a paper cited by the authors that focused attention on the fact that water seems to play a role in every known religion and is therefore likely to have been a contributing factor in whatever beliefs lie behind Palaeolithic art. If entoptic phenomena are indeed universal, then it is reasonable to make the same supposition for them. I am a little uneasy, however, that the hypothesis relies so heavily on only two, albeit excellent, ethnographic studies.

It also appears that the theory cannot fail simply because there are very few basic shapes that one can draw, whether they come from the mind's eye, hallucinations, or idle doodling: dots, lines, grids, squiggles, and simple geometric shapes. It is hardly surprising that these occur with some frequency in Palaeolithic contexts and that the simpler "signs" are found all over the place; it is the more complex designs, such as "tectiforms" and "scutiforms," that are limited to particular regions and/or phases. With the authors, one can interpret these as "different expectations and standardisations of visions and afterimages," but what does this add to earlier suggestions such as ethnic markers (Leroi-Gourhan 1980), and so forth?

My criticism is therefore not (as anticipated by the authors) that virtually any mark can be interpreted as an entoptic phenomenon but that in any collection of nonfigurative art there are bound to be lots of marks that look like some or all of the six entoptic categories presented in the paper. There are so many apparently nonfigurative shapes and combinations of shapes in Palaeolithic portable and parietal art that it would be amazing if these basic categories were *not* present.

Thus, although it is reasonable to suppose that entoptic phenomena were a contributing factor to Palaeolithic signs, the authors run the risk of producing another of those all-embracing theories that are no longer acceptable for prehistoric art—particularly where they dismiss signs that do not fit their categories as being realistic depictions, simplified females, or intractable despite the numerous permutations their categories provide.

Similarly, I do not see why "therianthropes" should all be hallucinatory rather than depictions of ritual costumes and masks or simply of imaginary or mythological figures. If such images were commonly seen in hallucinations, I would have thought that they would be rather more abundant in the art: as it is, in parietal art they are limited to about 15 sites, with no more than half a dozen apiece (Leroi-Gourhan 1983:260).

To be fair, the paper claims only that some Palaeolithic depictions were fixed by people in altered state or experiencing afterimages, and one can hardly argue with that; most scholars would agree that shamanism and

hallucination (with or without mushrooms!) probably played a role in this period in Eurasia, although so far there has been no solid evidence for such phenomena. The authors believe that they have found such evidence, and if they can strengthen their case it will indeed be of importance, particularly if it provides some insight into the meaning of the depictions. Somewhat ominously, however, they admit that entoptic phenomena had different meanings and associations in different times and places, even within a single society. Their hope is that there may be a restricted range of specific meanings. Nevertheless, even if they can obtain good ethnographic information that delimits the meanings, this in no way proves that Palaeolithic meanings fell within that range: it merely makes it more plausible.

I have been deliberately pessimistic in this comment; it is obvious that we can prove virtually nothing about the meaning of Palaeolithic art in the absence of the artists as informants. The one possible road to salvation, however, lies in establishing factors which hold true across space and time, and the human nervous system is certainly a prime candidate. The authors are therefore to be applauded for stepping out onto such thin ice; their future studies, as well as work by other phosphene fans, may well take us as far as we are ever likely to get into the minds of the Palaeolithic artists.

H.-G. BANDI

Scharnachtalstr. 12, CH-3006 Bern, Switzerland. 6 x 87

Commenting on this paper is a rather difficult task because it demands, besides knowledge of Ice Age art, a certain intimacy with other disciplines, especially physiology and psychology. I prefer therefore to limit myself to some general remarks. Though I am not totally persuaded by the authors' interpretation of signs—I hesitate to accept that the enigma of Ice Age art, with its emphasis on animal figures, can be solved with the help of the "entoptic phenomena"—I think it is very good to attempt to approach our impressive heritage from the Ice Age in different ways; the far-reaching theories that have been employed for decades offer no hope of a solution. As shown in a symposium held in Switzerland some years ago (Bandi et al. 1979), collaboration among archeologists, zoologists, and ethologists can help us to learn more about the imagination of Upper Palaeolithic man. Another way might be to consider the testimony of symbolism. The considerations raised in this article should certainly be looked at seriously.

ROBERT G. BEDNARIK

*Australian Rock Art Research Association, P.O. Box 216, Caulfield South, Victoria 3162, Australia.
21 VIII 87*

The central premise in this innovative paper is that the order governing prehistoric art is derived from the functioning of the human nervous system in altered states.

My theorem establishing entoptic forms as our principal means of access to the Palaeolithic mind (Bednarik 1984b) has been enthusiastically adopted by the authors. Another crucial proposition of mine, that of the phylogenetic longevity of entoptic forms (Bednarik 1984b:28), is essential to their hypothesis. This and the use of other concepts earlier expressed by me prompt me to moderation in tempering their enthusiasm.

Not surprisingly, I concur with the authors' underlying theoretical postulates and find their neuropsychological argumentation persuasive, but their attempt to utilize the valuable research tools they have forged becomes progressively less convincing as their model is developed. This is partly because they fail to jettison ethnographic analogy and imaginative interpretation at the right moment and partly because the narrow perspective presented precludes evidence contradicting their final inferences. A regional rock-art sequence such as that of the Franco-Cantabrian area, which represents only on the order of 0.03% of the world's surviving rock art, provides no adequate basis for identifying universal trends that have strikingly profound implications (cf. Anati's [1986] warning).

The authors' opinion that entoptic phenomena and iconic hallucinations have always coexisted is overwhelmingly refuted by the evidence from at least four continents. For instance, every completely repatinated petroglyph (and I am not suggesting that degree of patination is a function of age alone [Bednarik 1979]) that I have ever examined in North and South America is of a noniconic and entoptic form; among the hundreds of thousands of Australian petroglyphs that one can reasonably attribute to the Pleistocene I am not aware of a single design element that is not an entoptic form (Bednarik 1986b:164, 1986c:242); and the authors themselves cite Marshack's pioneer work on pre-Aurignacian marking traditions in Europe, which are also completely noniconic. The duration of this "noniconic period" was greater than that of the succeeding "iconic period," at least in Europe and Australia. The only explanation the authors would offer for this worldwide development is that of changed social circumstances. This feeble construct provides no real challenge of Davis's (1986a) attempt to explain the "discovery" of iconicity—a model which can account for the empirical phenomena Lewis-Williams and Dowson cannot address with theirs. Moreover, a sophisticated debate involving neurophysiological and neuropsychological concepts as well as creative and deductive reasoning (e.g., Davis 1986c; Hamilton-Smith 1986; Faulstich 1986, n.d.) has recently demonstrated how prefigurative markings can be examined scientifically. Such endeavors to account for these phenomena involve no altered states, shamans, or ethnographic analogies, yet they are not even mentioned by the present authors.

By attributing iconic hallucinations to Middle Palaeolithic hominids Lewis-Williams and Dowson merely defer the question of origins instead of providing an answer for it. If one were to probe the origins of the early comprehension of iconicity as postulated by the authors, one

would in effect be striving to explain a phenomenon the mere existence of which is not supported by one iota of evidence. No intellectual capacity "was always there," and most certainly not the aptitude for cerebral image conceptualization. Moreover, the authors' own hypothesis offers a perfectly adequate explanation. In Stage 2 of their progression of mental imagery, subjects consciously elaborate entoptics into spontaneous iconic forms, which presupposes an ability to visualize self-generated figurative iconography. The corollary that hominids lacking that ability would not have been capable of proceeding from Stage 1 to Stage 2 offers itself as a variation of Lewis-Williams and Dowson's ideas—one that would not just accommodate the empirical evidence but even facilitate the explanation of certain other developments heralding the Upper Palaeolithic.

Trance hypothesis is no panacea for the immense complexities facing us in prehistoric art. Once we peel away the hardened, almost fossilized layer of unsubstantiated assumptions, half-truths, prejudices, and misidentifications we have allowed to accumulate (cf. Bahn 1986a, Clottes 1986), how much do we *really* know about the social attitudes, structures, and values of, say, the Aurignacians? Over the years I have deliberately resisted the temptation to seek a link between the entoptic phenomena of the Pleistocene and those known from several recent rock-art traditions, and I have indeed emphasized that my theories derive no support from certain ethnographic claims or observations (Bednarik 1986b:165). While it may have been preferable for this separation to have been maintained, the authors have taken the plunge, and their propositions must be considered.

Despite my reservations and criticism, I find some interpretive aspects of the paper surprisingly plausible. In particular, the illustrations of Upper Palaeolithic therianthropes and of possible associations of entoptic forms with figurative art present some attractive alternatives to previous ideas. They will have to be carefully considered in the light of chronological or geographical distribution patterns and other evidence.

JOHN CLEGG

*Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney,
Sydney, N.S.W. 2006, Australia. 14 VIII 87*

This provocative paper gives us new ways to analyse pictures. The model should have cross-cultural validity, but its use presents problems of control.

Prehistorians working with *text-free* pictures (Hawkes 1954) have few suitable models. Until recently the literature hardly mentioned art historians, critics, aestheticians, or even the Egyptologist Schäfer (1974) but used unstated and diffuse norms (naturalistic, childlike, schematised, stylised, iconic, and so forth), undefined, uncontrolled, and almost useless.

Psychologists once believed that certain aspects of patients' pictures were diagnostic of mental illness. Anne

Anastasi found exactly the same traits in pictures made by respectable everyday, sane people *who had no academic training as artists* (Anastasi and Foley 1940:355):

Only by observing the artistic behaviour of a wide variety of groups, each differing from the others in a different aspect, can we tease out the factors conditioning the particular behaviour. Observations limited to a single type of subject may lead to incorrect generalizations. A given characteristic of children's drawings, for example, may be superficially attributed to maturational level; or some recurrent feature in the drawings of the insane may be ascribed to their emotional disorder or mental deterioration. Examination of the drawings by untrained normal adults, however, may reveal the same features and thereby suggest that such characteristics follow only from the lack of formal artistic training common to the three groups.

Knowledge about untrained normal adults' pictures would be valuable to prehistorians (Clegg 1979) as well as psychologists. A symposium of the First AURA Congress in Darwin next September is broadly aimed at this topic (Clegg 1987a).

Few of us would rule out the possibility that altered states of consciousness sometimes accompanied Palaeolithic pictures, and it would be interesting to identify "altered-state" pictures. Lewis-Williams and Dowson seem careful to avoid claiming such a capacity. In the absence of a control—perhaps pictures produced in the laboratory *before* the artists entered their altered states—we cannot tell whether the traits described are produced *only* by artists who have undergone some altered state of consciousness. Since these sorts of pictures are the products of neurological hardware, they could be expected in ordinary people's ordinary pictures. The six entoptic forms amount to a good basic graphic vocabulary, and the seven principles are a good basic guide to variation. Graphic artists as well as musical composers sometimes work (or play)¹ with variations on a theme.

I like this paper and wonder how easily it might be applied to the data I struggle with (Clegg 1984, 1987b), several thousand old (some may be Pleistocene) petroglyphs at a large site in western New South Wales. Many of the marks can be recognised as depictions of animals' tracks and simple non-figurative lines, spirals, asterisks, and circles. Very few look like pictures of people, kangaroos, or lizards. Several of the petroglyphs do not look like anything and are classified as complex non-figuratives. No two are alike, though some are variations on a theme (see fig. 1). Some overlap "tracks." I have failed to infer their relative age from the overlap. Until reading the present paper, I had thought of them as exploratory variations. Now I realise that the explorations may have been performed by a psychoneurological system in an altered state of consciousness, and I feel I almost have a way to analyse them.

1. The exploratory business of artists can be described by either word.




FIG. 1. Complex non-figurative petroglyphs from the "Nebula" subsite, Sturt's Meadows, western New South Wales. Average distance between originals approximately 10 m, average diameter about 400 mm. Petroglyphs like these occur nowhere else on the site. Whether the bird and kangaroo tracks are associated with them is unknown.

MARIO CONSENS

*Centro de Investigación de Arte Rupestre del Uruguay,
Ave. 18 de Julio 2172/501, Montevideo, Uruguay.*

14 IX 87

Lewis-Williams's various papers for CA in the last five years have aroused in me a deep respect for his scientific personality. He has expressed ideas about the meaning and function of rock art that have provoked intense criticism among investigators. He supports revolutionary forms of description of rock art, and he has the great virtue of continually revising his ideas. Besides, he is an honest man who really believes what he says. His papers perform the role of a spur for the rock-art specialist community. At the same time, because of all this, it is very difficult to produce a methodical criticism of this paper, in which he takes a pseudoepistemological approach to the subject (a mixture of axioms, assertions, and beliefs and ethnographic, neurophysiological, and biological data) that takes into consideration a period of more than three thousand years on three continents. My comments are quite similar to those made by others on an earlier effort (Clegg 1982, Groenfeldt 1982, Vastokas 1982). I do not accept the Lewis-Williams and Dowson model. To accept it would amount to acquiring a universal, timeless decoder for all signs.

The authors start from altered states of consciousness produced by use of mescaline and LSD and extrapolate to any other kind of trance, overlooking the evidence of ethnic differences in pharmacokinetics (Kalow, Goedde, and Agarwal 1986). They say that all the geometric signs are phosphenes, but they do not tell us that the informant on those altered states can only describe what is filtered through his own cultural information (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1985:296). Nor do they warn us that in such altered states it is almost impossible to separate figure from ground (Dawson 1963). They do not mention the more than 30 phosphenes currently identified, of which they selectively refer to only 6. They do not consider that the Tukano perceive these phosphenes with "notorious lateral symmetry" (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1985:293).

They include in the category "shaman" both the lone visionary of the Siberians and the collective Tukano. They consider San and Coso arts comparable, but anyone can observe that the motifs (assemblages of signs) are very different. This paper forces us again to accept San art as unconditionally shamanic. They cannot simply say that it has shamanic components; their model calls for wholeness. They disregard previous criticisms in these pages (Bardill 1982, Inskeep 1982, Willcox 1983, Woodhouse 1984). We are asked to accept that Coso art is shamanic because a modern informant suggests it, overlooking the fact that this informant was acculturated, completely removed from his social context, and thus unable to provide an emic interpretation satisfying the Western observer. This kind of informant, generally surrounded and harassed by ethnologists and anthropologists, can only express his ignorance about the meaning of iconic forms by saying that they are "supernatural beings" or commonplaces.

Lewis-Williams and Dowson think that the U shapes on "decorated handprints" represent the sensation of tingling in the hands reported by shamans in the 19th century. What are we to think, then, about the fact that most South American handprints (in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile) are child-size? Perhaps that South American shamans were dwarves?

I am uneasy about their methodology. Everyone accepts social explanation in archaeology, but I cannot accept as "social explanation" the state of mind of certain shaman's apprentices more than 40,000 years ago, inside European caves, absorbing the power from depictions. Lewis-Williams and Dowson make too many assumptions. They have enough to tell us without forcing on us these inconceivable exercises in postdiction. They say that their omissions strengthen their proposition, and this is true in the sense that if one takes out of a model what doesn't make sense, it will appear more convincing.

The weakest point in their model arises from juggling only six phosphenes and seven principles governing their perception to cover rock art from San, Coso, and Upper Palaeolithic contexts. They do not say that phosphenes are culturally selected and this is the source of their variety. The model is like a wonderful kaleidoscope in which a few phosphenes combine with a set of principles neglecting cultural selection in three stages obtained only with mescaline and LSD in specific lab situations to interpret prehistoric art. No time, no place, no culture: these are "the signs of all times."

I can accept their assertion that "it is logically impossible to induce meaning from numerical rock-art data" only in part. Deprived of direct sources (and this does not necessarily mean ethnography), we must work with quantitative and qualitative data. It is true that the meaning of the signs is impossible to determine from numerical rock-art data. Nor is it possible to obtain any kind of meaning without taking into account the structure of synchronic depictions, as they claim. I believe that we can avoid misuse of numerical rock-art data if (1) we accept (or even believe) that there are regularities in human behaviour that are expressed in the structure of synchronic depictions; (2) we do not seek to extract meaning directly from symbols but rather attempt from synchronic depictions and their corological and spatial relationships to obtain a probabilistically controlled pattern of regularities and anomalies from which some meaningful structure or model (not necessarily the meaning of the signs themselves) may emerge. With this structure—which one might even call "style"—we will be in a better position to consider social information from a particular period of human behaviour as a whole. Partition of the context into similar simple forms cannot be accepted (see also Pretty 1982).

I am surprised by Lewis-Williams and Dowson's statement "We see our position as preparatory to the elucidation of synchronic and diachronic variability." For me, these kinds of elucidation are technical devices that we must employ from the beginning of any rock-art research. Nowadays infrared films, spectral colour sliding,

and quantitative analysis are standard procedure (Consens 1986).

Their paper is stimulating, nevertheless, and their intelligent proposals will compel all investigators to think about their objectives. This kind of paper clarifies the limits beyond which we fall into science fiction or paleopsychology.

WHITNEY DAVIS

*Department of Art History, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Ill. 60208, U.S.A. 21 VIII 87*

This is a clear and provocative paper. It builds from well-known research to some unexpectedly strong conclusions. The strong dose of speculation and downright unproved assertion—with the required “academic” mix of may-haves and possibly—is invigorating.

The hypothesis that entoptic phenomena may be “externalized,” “fixed,” depicted, or otherwise genetically or referentially related to nonrepresentational or representational graphic displays, however these in turn are defined, has been around for some time now. For instance, in 1965 two neuropsychologists and a specialist in children’s drawing concluded that children’s prefigurative scribbles resemble certain phosphenes as reported or sketched by adult subjects (Kellogg, Knoll, and Kugler 1965; cf. Anderson 1975). Although they drew no absolutely explicit inferences, they evidently believed that the entoptic experiences were somehow carried over into the drawing. In my opinion, a clear understanding of this process of transfer has not yet been achieved. The vague terms used for it—“externalization” or, as in this paper, “fixing”—still require elucidation.

Application of the hypothesis to rock arts has been made repeatedly in the literature (e.g., Blackburn 1977; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978b; Davis 1986c:53; Lewis-Williams 1986a). In a series of important papers (which Lewis-Williams and Dowson do not really engage), Bednarik (1984a, b; 1986a, b; n.d.) has investigated morphological correlations between entoptics (phosphenes) and apparently noniconic European and Australian Upper Paleolithic parietal markings (the comments on Bednarik 1986b should be useful to readers of the present paper).

Lewis-Williams and Dowson advance the discussion of the hypothesis in several ways. Although it will always be difficult to distinguish in practice between “entoptics” and “hallucinations” and between “noniconic” and “iconic” patterns, their terminological clarifications are helpful (see also Tyler 1978:1633 and Davis 1986c:53 for use of “entoptics” vs. “phosphenes,” “form constants”). For readers who may be unfamiliar with the rock arts of various North American Indian societies and of the southern San, their remarks on the shamanistic context and reference of iconography, with some intriguing further examples, will be useful. Lewis-Williams’s research on the southern San constellation of trance dancing and rock painting is well known, and his findings have been pretty much broadly accepted; I am

not familiar with the detailed findings or structure of argument of the unpublished paper cited for Coso shamanism and rock art. Their model of six types of entoptics, seven modes of “perceiving” them, and three stages in a subject’s experience of the altered state of consciousness, although perhaps overly complex and certainly tendentious at the moment, at least gives us somewhere to start. As they say, it is founded in “universals” of hominid perceptual neurology. It may therefore serve as an appropriate control for the study of cultural conventions of what Noll (1985) has called “mental imagery cultivation.” Finally, they put all their cards on the table in proposing some specific examples of Upper Paleolithic marking with an entoptic component (that is, source and/or reference, a distinction they do not always clarify) and hope that further scrutiny will confirm their views. As a “position paper,” the article is extremely elegant.

Despite its usefulness, I have some reservations about the paper. The discussions of entoptics and their transformations and of “mental imagery” in “altered states of consciousness”—tendentious enough terms to begin with!—are clear as far as they go. However, the literature on these subjects is immense, ranging from bald reports of subjects’ experiences to highly complex theoretical accounts; moreover, it is various in its ontological and epistemological claims (see Noll 1985 and Asaad and Shapiro 1986 for two reviews) and somewhat confusing, to this outsider at least. I would reserve judgment on Lewis-Williams and Dowson’s presentation—which is not, of course, for publication in a journal of perceptual or cognitive psychology.

More to the immediate point, I find the identification of an “entoptic” component in the Upper Paleolithic “iconic” representations actually cited here (fig. 4, IV and V) somewhat strained. It seems difficult to distinguish morphologically between a stylized iconic representation of horns or hair (that is, where stylization is not symbolic or, at least, does not refer to entoptic phenomena) and “entoptically” derived forms “construed” representationally. (Moreover, even if entoptic and picture *are* morphologically identical, this is not enough, in itself, to show they are related; a film I make might be morphologically indistinguishable from a dream I once had without that film’s *thereby* deriving from and/or depicting that dream—but more on this below.) This is not to say that I reject the hypothesis. It is logically possible that images in the technical sense could evolve from the second-order “construal” of entoptics. I would subsume that process under the general rubric of “seeing-as” and “disambiguation” that I have considered elsewhere as one of the fundamental perceptual-neurological events determining depiction (Davis 1986a, 1987)—for depictions of entoptic phenomena may well be one kind of “ground” (along with natural forms, fortuitously produced man-made marks, nonrepresentational but semantic marks, etc.) for the replication of images of “external objects.”

Despite some rhetoric about underlying “universal” processes and the “origins” of representation as such

(more about this below), in this paper Lewis-Williams and Dowson have really offered an *iconographical decipherment* of previously puzzling visual displays, just as Lewis-Williams has done already (e.g., 1981a) for the iconography of southern San rock art. I expect that most debate will center upon the plausibility of their decipherment in relation to (possibly in combination with) competing decipherments. Obviously, we have no direct access to Paleolithic or any other minds: as always, we have to interpret the physical properties and context of the graphic display—its apparent morphology, distribution, mode of manufacture, deposition, and preservation—as most compellingly and comprehensively explained by supposing it is a sign and/or assigning it such-and-such a reference (Davis 1987:127–28; n.d.). This is the necessarily roundabout and uncomfortable but in some ways preeminently anthropological, archaeological, or historical fate of interpretation.

In this light, it may be recalled that Marshack's decipherment of a "notation" in some Paleolithic graphics is really quite penetrating. For instance, whereas Lewis-Williams and Dowson take what they call the "zigzag line, set of overlapping chevrons which form, in effect, a zigzag, and a number of discrete chevrons" engraved on the famous supposedly Upper Perigordian pebble from Barma Grande, Grimaldi (they illustrate only one face, fig. 4, II), to exemplify the "fragmentation" of the "catenary curve" entoptic (Principle 2 for fig. 1, V), Marshack (1972:81–86, figs. 16, 17) can account rather more precisely for *almost every line and for the overall structure or "composition" of the display*—in this case, as having the notational differentiation of a calendrical statement for a three-month lunar period (no "fragmentation" in this!). I am not asking Lewis-Williams and Dowson to dispute Marshack or the various structural semiotic readings of Paleolithic syntax (*without* much semantic decipherment) by Leroi-Gourhan (e.g., 1968c), Sauvet, Sauvet, and Włodarczyk (1977), and others, for they are entitled to present their own alternative; moreover, it is even conceivable that Marshack-like notations or other scripts could have derived, like images, as "construals" of entoptics, as a general model would admit (Davis 1986a, 1987). Nevertheless, in comparison with Marshack's as it stands their decipherment, although perhaps covering many cases, lacks the power precisely to account for specific morphology and syntax. Alternatively, it buys this power too easily and cheaply, for, as they come close to admitting, anything and everything can be interpreted as a permutation of one of the rather casually defined entoptic "types." True denotation, whether depiction or not, must definitely *rule out* some morphologies as being overly ambiguous or non-denotational—as being outside the system of reference (Goodman 1972, Elgin 1983). But despite Lewis-Williams and Dowson's claim to have isolated some basic types (perhaps true as far as it goes), ultimately we have no good idea of what could *not* count as entoptic or hallucinatory, and therefore as it stands the "decipherment" is impossible to evaluate or refute. A proponent can always say, "Well, perhaps this is just what Paleo-

lithic people experienced entoptically or hallucinatorily."

It is clear, then, that to assess the plausibility of the decipherment (*vis-à-vis* competitors), we must investigate the possible place of entoptically derived graphics (noniconic or iconic) and of images of entoptics in Upper Paleolithic society. Presumably, using the rich anthropological literature on shamanism, we can do better than the sketchy and by now cliché invocation of initiation, imprinting, validation, and so on.

All of the "implications" raised by Lewis-Williams and Dowson need close scrutiny. I will take up just one topic close to my own current interests. I do not think that this or any particular iconographic decipherment, whatever the antiquity of the images or their apparent association with "universal" perceptual processes, says anything about the "origin of representational art" as such. It may say something about a historical origin, but there have been many of these. The paper is marked by some uneasiness and even confusion on this point. It is sometimes not clear whether graphic displays morphologically resembling entoptic phenomena are taken by Lewis-Williams and Dowson to be genuinely symbolic (denotational) at all. Insofar as entoptic and hallucinatory phenomena are intrinsic to the hominid nervous system, they are not, strictly speaking, "images" at all, on any developed definition of that term: they are percepts or perceptions. (Oddly, cognitive psychologists like Kosslyn [1983] have been studying pictures to understand the properties of "mental images.") For anthropological or historical purposes, we have to know how perceptions are extrasomatically *symbolized* (and similarly for nonvisual cognitive phenomena such as propositions, attitudes, "thoughts," or object labels). Although the perceptual and cognitive activities may be intrinsic and universal, the extrasomatic symbolic ones (e.g., depiction or notation) are not, and they cannot be taken for granted. As I have pointed out elsewhere, that our visual system is operating as it ordinarily does under various stimulations—of light entering the lens of the eye, of mechanical pressure on the cornea, etc.—does not mean that we can design and use an extrasomatic representational system (denotational or symbolic system) preserving any of this information. Further conditions or processes must be specified to take us from perceptual to graphic abilities and experiences. A relation of reference must be forged between graphic marks (or other media) and perceptual experience such that the marks denote or depict experience when this relation holds in a particular way (Davis 1986c:54). As I see it, this is the question of the origins of representation. My answer to it (Davis 1986a, 1987), although criticized by Lewis-Williams and Dowson, does not contradict but crosscuts and in my opinion would actually have to underwrite theirs. They propose that the entoptic percept—often experienced as floating before the observer—and afterimages of it (described in Gombrichean terms as "projections") may have been "traced" by the subject/observer, effecting, of course, our crucial transition from percept to graphic display. This is a highly

specialized suggestion that actually has only a secondary place in their structure of argument; it is one explanation of how the subject/observer could have carried out the project of symbolizing entoptics should he or she have desired to do so. Although it has an honorable place in traditional aesthetics, the projection/tracing theory is, I think, fatally restricted and incomplete. For one thing, tracing is a difficult and unlikely procedure (just try tracing your own afterimages on a wall or shadow on the ground or even the far simpler task, recommended in the Renaissance for studying lines of projection and the vanishing point, of tracing your face in a cloudy mirror). Much more worrying, the theory actually says nothing *essentially* about symbolization or reference at all. For instance, I can certainly trace a signature to forge it, not to refer to it; in fact, in forging your signature I certainly do *not* want to refer to it. *If and only if* the trace *in turn* stands for or denotes that which it necessarily also resembles does it become an image in the strict sense (Maynard [1986] rightly criticizes Davis [1986a] for inadequately recognizing this, and see Davis [1987: n. 22, 23, 26]). Again, this ability or interest, although based on universal perceptual and cognitive processes, is not automatic. It is actually quite difficult to give a nontautologous formal account of it. In a general model of origins, I would not rely on anything so cognitively specialized as an "altered state of consciousness" (for images originate nonconventionally but quite "normally" among children) or anything so technically specialized as tracing projections. In a general model, images originate in the replication of seeing-as as such or for itself (Davis 1987). It would be intriguing to discover that the referent of the images in one such canonical chain of replications was an entoptic, as Lewis-Williams and Dowson might claim for the Paleolithic chain, but *the ability to refer to an entoptic pictorially* was actually acquired in another way, although no less "intrinsically." Indeed, the cultural expectation or convention to "draw an entoptic," as to "draw a bison," may have crystallized quite late in a replicatory sequence beginning in some simpler and more common mark-making activity such as "digital fluting" (Bednarik 1986a, Davis 1987). In all of this, I am stressing not so much our disagreement as our divergence in asking and answering different questions: whereas Lewis-Williams and Dowson really are asking what Upper Paleolithic graphics might have meant, I ask how they could have meant anything at all.

BRIGITTE DELLUC AND GILLES DELLUC
U.A. 184 du CNRS, Musée de l'Homme, 75016 Paris,
France. 9 IX 87

In the difficult field of semiological analysis of the parietal and mobiliary art of the Upper Palaeolithic, any attempt at interpretation, however limited, is worthy of consideration. Very prudently, Lewis-Williams and Dowson's work on the origin and description of entoptic phenomena (phosphenes and form constants) and their

possible implications for Palaeolithic symbolism is confined to a study of the perception of simple geometric forms, spontaneous or induced (including the very common vision of bodies floating in the vitreous humour), to the exclusion of the various types of hallucination (the patient being aware or not of the abnormal character of these complex visions that, in contrast to optical illusions, have no external object). Nor does it claim to provide an explanation for the very distinctive signs (pseudoarrows, claviforms, and tectiforms), to which should doubtless be added most of Leroi-Gourhan's thick and thin signs with probable sexual connotations. In fact, with reference to the complexity of the signs at Lascaux, Leroi-Gourhan admitted to us shortly before his death, "At Lascaux I really believed they had come very close to an alphabet."

The present study is an update on the question of the entoptic origin of the elementary graphic units that are so frequent in mobiliary art and so often omitted from the inventories of parietal art. It carries much farther the previous modest attempt by Desban (1976), inspired as it was by the work of Max Knoll and G. Oster, which sought, through the use of phosphenes, to draw a parallel between certain signs in prehistoric art and certain elements in contemporary art (particularly in the works of Paul Klee and Joan Miro).¹

PAUL FAULSTICH
Institute of Culture and Communication, East-West
Center, 1777 East-West Rd., Honolulu, Hawaii 96848,
U.S.A. 26 VIII 87

The model presented by Lewis-Williams and Dowson indicates that scholars are returning to their own neuropsychological structure in trying to uncover the deeper significance of prehistoric signs and symbols. This approach is a natural next step in what has proved to be an increasingly provocative conversation with the past. Providing insight into the foundations of symboling and the meaningfulness of Upper Paleolithic art, the model has far-reaching implications.

Excellent examples of iconic/entoptic combinations occur in prehistoric arts throughout the world. Lewis-Williams and Dowson's model could be applied to the X-ray rock art of Arnhem Land, Australia, in which a subject's internal organs and skeletal features are illustrated. It suggests that iconic depictions associated with entoptic forms originated within the third stage of altered states of consciousness. Early X-ray art, which is graphic in form and simple in execution, may have been derived from mental images produced during the final stage of altered consciousness, in which entoptics may persist during iconic hallucinations. If symbolic associations are unavoidable in representational art, as Lewis-Williams and Dowson imply, then a cognitive correlation could have been made between gridlike entoptic forms and skeletal features. Once this connection was

1. Translated by Mary Turton.

made, the art could have developed into the well-known complex representations of humans and animals that incorporate such features as backbones, lungs, and even breast milk. In the final phases of this art, inanimate objects such as rifles are painted with X-ray features. Contemporary Arnhem Land bark paintings continue to combine entoptic and iconic forms. Far from being mere filler, the entoptic forms are finely integrated patterns with symbolic meaning. I am not arguing that Lewis-Williams and Dowson's model explains the origins of X-ray art; rather I am playing with the applicability of the model to an artistic tradition other than their three examples.

My understanding of Lewis-Williams and Dowson's argument is that art having visual similarities with entoptic phenomena originated through a process of conscious imitation rather than free-flowing, unselfconscious spontaneity. Primal arts in general—not only shamanistic arts—ubiquitously incorporate entoptic forms. It could be that both entoptic phenomena and primal symbols derive directly from the same ordering and pattern-producing neurological function rather than the art's being informed by entoptics. If so, there may have been no need for artists to base their image making on review and imitation of entoptic phenomena. Human image making emerges from complex associations and motivations; to ascribe its origins to entoptic imagery alone may not be adequate. We are a long way from understanding the intricate details of symbolic relationships in the art of contemporary peoples, let alone that of the Upper Paleolithic.

Entoptic patterns have a striking immediacy, both visually and psychologically. As Lewis-Williams and Dowson indicate, however, this does not prevent entoptic forms from being saturated with complex meaning. The human mind strives to process sensory information—to structure it and to shape it into workable, accessible knowledge. The inescapability of symbolic modelling among *Homo sapiens sapiens* complicates our ability to grasp meaning from prehistoric art, for we are dealing with imagery rich in culturally based associations. All we can hope to produce is realistic and constructive interpretations of interpretations.

In symbolism, a visual similarity allows one image to represent another while transcending itself. Images are not necessarily representative of only one object or concept. Often, there is a continuum of symbolic meaning in which images are multivocal to varying degrees. The patterns integrated into the Coso anthropomorphs, for example, may depict *both* internal power and ornate garments, not necessarily one or the other. We should refrain from applying dualistic categories to prehistoric arts—all of which are infused with *cultural* as well as natural symbols.

Lewis-Williams and Dowson portray Upper Paleolithic and shamanistic art as the result of a controlled and systematic undertaking. They are right in observing that image making did not necessarily evolve from simple to complex. Complex mental images certainly could have been reduced to schematic form. Thus, a line of

horses' heads may have been reduced to a zigzag just as a zigzag may have been elaborated into a line of horses' heads. It is conceivable that an association between a zigzag line and the heads of galloping horses could be perceived in a single instant. Although its occurrence would be extremely significant, this sort of perceptual quantum leap would be difficult if not impossible to pinpoint in the development of an artistic tradition.

This brings me to a related point: referring to figure 5b as a "clearly hallucinatory composition" is an overly liberal reading of a complex iconic/entoptic integration. This interpretation is laden with cultural predilections and does not give sufficient credit to the reflexive and interpretive aspects of creativity. Primal arts utilize symbols which operate on both the reflective, intellectual level and the nonreflective, perceptual level. Schematization is a sophisticated cognitive and artistic device for eliminating the inessential and portraying an object diagrammatically.

On a less theoretical note, Lewis-Williams and Dowson present some unsubstantiated suppositions. For example, irrespective of their initial qualifications, they repeatedly refer to Coso petroglyphs as "shamanistic art," a claim for which there is no conclusive ethnographic evidence. In spite of much speculation, we should not prematurely attribute a shamanistic origin to this art.

Lewis-Williams and Dowson have shifted away from the usual vehicles of research—ethnography and internal analysis. They present a model which, they believe, objectively reveals Upper Paleolithic art to be the product of identifiable stages of altered consciousness. In spite of my caveats, I am very taken with their model, especially when I read it as exploratory rather than conclusive. Lewis-Williams and Dowson's concept of a "neurological bridge" which gains us access to Upper Paleolithic imagery is an important contribution to our deepening understanding of prehistoric art.

JOHN HALVERSON

Adlai E. Stevenson College, University of California,
Santa Cruz, Calif. 95064, U.S.A. 19 VIII 87

This paper offers an extremely interesting and persuasive explanation of those indeed "intractable" figures traditionally called "signs." In fact, it is the first really credible explanation that I have seen. The account of entoptic phenomena and processes is lucid, the main argument cogent, and the heuristic use of ethnography admirable in respect to San and Coso depictions (although I should think Bednarik [1984b] deserved a good deal more recognition for his explicit identification of phosphene types with Australian petroglyphs).

The authors do avoid "simplistic ethnographic analogy" in the main, but I wonder whether something of the sort has not slipped into the later part of the paper in assumptions made about shamanism and ritual. For example, "*because* [emphasis added] shamanism is so pervasively associated with foraging societies," the authors

conclude that "in the Upper Palaeolithic this association probably had at least some features in common with what we understand by shamanism." This is surely a shameless appeal to analogy. There are also references to "novices . . . on a vision quest," "elaborate rituals," "spirit helpers from whom shamans obtained power," etc. If everything stated or implied in these passages is perfectly possible, yet the source of such speculation can only be ethnographic analogy; the depictions themselves carry no such implications. It is, after all, equally possible that no ritual of any kind was involved and that these people knew nothing of spirits, vision quests, or shamans. That they did hallucinate is plausible, but the plausibility rests first of all on the fact that hallucinating is a human biological phenomenon (the "neurological bridge"), which need not have been enculturated in any way. Indeed, it may have been a common experience, not something especially to be sought or avoided but just a part of life. Many things can induce visions: the authors mention flickering light, fatigue, sensory deprivation, intense concentration, and rhythmic movement, for example, all of which, one might assume, were not infrequent in the lives of Paleolithic hunter-gatherers. Hence, in the limited sense the authors propose, virtually anyone could have been a "shaman." And if visions were commonplace, why should they be singled out for depiction? It is, I suppose, to answer this implicit question that the authors take doubtful recourse to ethnographic analogy. In this case, the San analogue is precarious enough in itself (Lewis-Williams 1982). I do not mean the trance theory, which seems solidly based, but rather the supposed ritual context, for which the evidence is thin.

The most difficult part of the paper for me is the last section, which sets out to answer the question of how people came to realize that two-dimensional marks could represent three-dimensional objects. So far as I can see, the question is not answered, for unless geometrical entoptics are assumed to be three-dimensional, which seems most unlikely, two-dimensional depictions simply represent two-dimensional mental images. But the real subject seems to be not perception (the capacity in question is probably to a large degree innate in any case) but the origins of depictive activity. And here the authors espouse a bold and controversial projection theory (one quite different from Gombrich's, incidentally). Has anyone actually been known to trace projected images on the surface where the images appear to be? Furthermore, since the projected entoptics are characterized by constant movement and fluctuation from one pattern to another, would not their "fixing" by tracing be virtually impossible? It seems more reasonable to assume that the depictions were based on memory (as is suggested for San painters), which had already "fixed" salient images. Thus there is no need to suppose that "for their makers, the earliest depictions were visual images: hallucinations and depictions were one." If the makers of animal depictions "did not suppose that they stood for 'real' animals any more than the accompanying entoptic depictions represented (iconically) things in the real world," what *did* they suppose? Surely the implication

is that they knew they were depicting mental images. In the case of animals, moreover, there would be no difference in memory images between hallucinations and visual perceptions, and both would "stand for" external objects. Otherwise put, memory images of real animals would supersede hallucinations in the process of construal, a supposition supported by the "realism" of animal depictions (there are extremely few fantastic animals in cave art, though these might be expected from a hallucinatory source). In short, people probably understood quite well that depictions were depictions, representing things seen, optically or entoptically, and the question of why depictions were made at all remains open.

Up to a point, then, the authors' theory seems thoroughly convincing. As an explanation of so-called signs as representations of entoptic phenomena, it offers a brilliant solution to what has long seemed a hopeless problem. Perhaps it were best left at that. As an account of the origins of depiction, the theory has too many difficulties to be persuasive, but it is otherwise a major achievement.

ROBERT LAYTON

*Department of Anthropology, University of Durham,
43 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, England. 1 IX 87*

Lewis-Williams and Dowson recognize the problem that Upper Palaeolithic rock art has no exact modern counterpart and the difficulty this creates for explanation by ethnographic parallel. But in what way is their use of ethnographic analogy less simplistic than Breuil's? Presumably in its systematic application of a theory which accounts for a variety of motifs rather than the piecemeal selection of parallels from diverse cultures. Their paper usefully broadens the range of possible explanations of Palaeolithic signs, but how susceptible is their hypothesis to verification? They are no doubt correct that any explanation of the unique body of material which Palaeolithic cave art constitutes must begin by identifying some universal elements in human perception, but this is not enough; any adequate theory must also account for the diversity and uniqueness of different cultural traditions. While certain elements of Palaeolithic culture can be reconstructed beyond reasonable doubt, others may only be inferred on a balance of probabilities, and many guesses remain mere possibility. To which category does the present hypothesis belong?

While altered states of perception may induce universal images, they do not inevitably produce rock art. Is it not a relevant consideration that not all San rock-art techniques showed the same predilection for depicting allegedly entoptic motifs, despite the artists' possession of apparently similar belief systems? It would be false logic to argue that (a) optic stimulation always incites perception of grids; (b) Palaeolithic art motifs include grids; therefore (c) these grids are the product of optic stimulation. The missing step is that which would enable one to weigh the probability of this hypothesis against alternatives (traps, sexual signs, notations, etc.).

What level of proof do Lewis-Williams and Dowson claim? "A single zigzag would not be persuasive evidence"; "presence of all six [entoptic categories] suggests [emphasis added] that at least some of the art originated in certain altered states"; "the European example of replication is of a simpler variation"; horned or antlered humans are "better explained [emphasis added] by hallucination . . . because they . . . have clearly non-realistic features" (clarity assessed by what criteria?); "we expect examples as convincing as the San and Coso one to come to light" (how will degree of conviction be measured?).

The authors are probably correct to state that San art is now widely accepted as shamanistic, but what specific evidence is there that San artists intended to depict "entoptic" forms? It is often the most ambiguous motifs, such as "flying bucks," that seem to be used as firm evidence for depiction of trance experience. The security of this particular evidence should be assessed, as it is treated as proven in the remainder of the paper. Other ethnography should perhaps have been drawn from better-known cases of shamanic art, not poorly documented rock art. Does Inuit or Tibetan art embody "entoptic" forms? How probable is it that shamanism inevitably determines the form of art motifs?

Are Palaeolithic signs a unitary category in the artists' culture or a residual category of the analyst—those which cannot be construed as animals or anthropomorphs? Lewis-Williams and Dowson maintain that their argument is strengthened by the recognition that not all marks can be construed as entoptic; some "spears" may be realistic depictions of weapons, some claviforms of simplified female forms. But those which do not fit the six entoptic categories are described as residual: what independent means can be used to determine the unity of those construed as entoptic? Do they always occur juxtaposed only to other "entoptic" forms? Are they confined to certain types of location? The authors propose such a hypothesis when they state that the less accessible parts of some caves contain simpler and more fragmented figures but go on to note that similar motifs occur as artefacts. Even the fact that some motifs are entoptic in form does not prove they are entoptic in intent.

It is important not to elevate tendencies into universal principles. Lewis-Williams and Dowson write that shamanism is pervasively associated with foraging societies, but so is totemism. They suggest that shamans often go to remote places such as caves to meditate, but shamans are not the only people who visit caves.

Although my remarks are critical, they are not intended to be destructive; rather, they are aimed at suggesting how this interesting hypothesis might be used.

or derive from altered states of consciousness. Indeed, it has been argued that the production of virtually all art involves an alteration in consciousness and that traces of this can be detected in its form or content (e.g., Ehrenzweig 1953, Kris 1952, Martindale 1981). However, these altered states of consciousness are not necessarily so extreme as those induced by psychoactive drugs or sensory deprivation. Rather, the inspiration for works of art may derive from mildly altered states such as hypnagogic states, reverie, and fantasy.

It does not seem necessary to argue that Upper Paleolithic signs are always due to what Lewis-Williams and Dowson call entoptic phenomena. Visual activity is usually divided into several levels of neural processing: purely sensory activity, detection of elementary features such as lines, slits, and angles (Hubel and Wiesel 1965), and activation of sets of neurons coding "unitary percepts" or recognizable objects (Konorski 1967). Unitary percepts are presumably constructed from simultaneous activation of neurons coding elementary features (see Martindale 1981 for a review). Visual perception consists of "bottom-up" activation from the sensory level to the level of unitary percepts. Mental images or hallucinations consist of "top-down" activation from the level of unitary percepts to the sensory level. (If hallucinations and mental images did not include activation of neurons on lower levels of analysis, we would not be able to "see" them.) Presumably, phosphenes correspond to activation of neurons only on the sensory level, whereas Klüver's (1966 [1928]) "form constants" correspond to activation of neurons on both featural and sensory levels. Neural activity on the featural level occurs not only in the case of entoptic phenomena but also in the cases of normal perception and organized mental images and hallucinations. It is a common assumption that what Klüver called form constants are the basic building blocks of both veridical and hallucinatory perception. Given this, it makes sense to argue that form constants or "signs" can arise from normal perception if one attends to the featural level rather than to the level of unitary percepts.

Evidence for this contention comes from studies of children's drawings. Five of Lewis-Williams and Dowson's Upper Paleolithic "signs" are included in Kellogg's (1969:15) catalogue of the 20 basic "scribbles" found in the drawings of children from two to four years of age. The sixth (grids, lattices, ladders) is prominent in her listing of common aggregations of scribbles. (Kellogg and others have printed out the similarities between motifs in children's art and Paleolithic art.) To my knowledge, no one has argued that young children are trying to reproduce entoptic experiences in their drawings. It is generally agreed that children are not attempting to produce realistic drawings and failing because of lack of technical skill (Arnheim 1967, Harris 1963, Luquet 1927). Rather, as Luquet put it, the child draws "what he knows rather than what he sees" because he attends to different aspects of the optic array than the artist attempting to render what we call a realistic depiction (Gibson 1979). It would seem that the child is attempting to depict concepts or abstract essences rather than raw, specific per-

COLIN MARTINDALE

*Department of Psychology, University of Maine,
Orono, Maine 04469, U.S.A. 29 VII 87*

I agree with Lewis-Williams and Dowson that the "signs" of Upper Paleolithic art may be connected with

cepts. Because of this, basic features are attended to and irrelevant or idiosyncratic aspects of the optic array connected with perspective, viewing angle, shadowing, and so on, are ignored. It is notable that some autistic children so retarded that they seem quite literally to lack abstract concepts do produce, at very young ages, quite realistic drawings employing linear perspective, shading, and other devices (Selfe 1983).

It seems plausible that the goal of Upper Paleolithic artists was the same as that of children. That is, they were often attempting to depict either percepts or mental images but their notion of what is important differed markedly from what a modern artist aiming at photographic realism deems to be important. Their attention was drawn to the featural level of perception rather than to the less general level of unitary percepts. It is plausible that some Upper Paleolithic signs arose in precisely the way Lewis-Williams and Dowson say that they did. My point is that such signs may also have arisen from other causes having as much to do with the goal of the artist as with his or her state of consciousness.

VIL MIRIMANOV

*Institute of World Literature, Vorovsky str. 25a,
Moscow 121069, U.S.S.R. 28 IX 87*

This paper is certainly a bold one, but the conclusions it draws do not seem convincing. The set of rock depictions the authors choose to analyze and entoptic signs have in common only a rhythmic structure that can in some cases be traced to human physiology. The rhythmic character of entoptic phenomena is, moreover, evidently induced by neurological processes, while the recurrence of simple forms may be kinetic in origin, that is, brought about by monotonous movement, the so-called dance of an arm (Arutunov and Sergeev 1975:176). They may also be graphic counterparts of oral or musical rhythms (Mirimanov 1973:55-67). In many cases such forms are a simplistic symbolic depiction of an object. A zigzag, for instance, may be the symbolic depiction of a snake, water, and so on. Many signs, including some similar to entoptic ones, that we find in Neolithic art and the Metal Ages have been safely interpreted. Such "understandable" non-figurative depictions occur less often in Palaeolithic art because we know less about it, but they include "macaroni," hand imprints, arrow-like lines, vulvas, etc. There are many Neolithic and Eneolithic depictions that match the entoptics, but one would hardly imagine the stockbreeders, hunters, or cultivators of Eurasia covering the rocks with depictions of anomalous entoptic phenomena.

As for the zooanthropomorphic paintings, they are definitely not the result of hallucinations. In the Sahara and South Africa they are in some cases camouflaged hunters and in others ritualistic masked dancers. Furthermore, zooanthropomorphic depictions constitute the basis of all traditional art. Finally, what little we

know about rock art yields no evidence as to any shamanistic origin for these paintings.¹

CHRISTY G. TURNER II

*Department of Anthropology, Arizona State
University, Tempe, Ariz. 85287, U.S.A. 20 VIII 87*

This essay is exhilarating and disappointing at the same time. A brilliantly creative application of biological information to the archaeological problem of interpreting Paleolithic rock art, the presentation is weakened by the authors' position that it is "logically impossible to induce meaning from numerical rock-art data, as it is from any data." How many times a day does a scientist say: "What these data mean is that . . ."? It is precisely the lack of quantitative information for sample sizes, central tendencies, associations, and variation that reduces their proposition to argument rather than hypothesis testing, from science to polemics.

What is their proposition? Simply put, they offer that some rock-art designs are mimics of visual artifacts of the nervous system, such as simple hallucinations—artifacts said to be documented in laboratory and case studies, especially involving persons in variously altered mental states (I tried for a week to induce the effect on myself but got nothing, even in an altered state). Using an independently derived shape classification of these visual artifacts, the authors try to identify corresponding types in African San, American Coso, and widely distributed Paleolithic rock art. Simple designs are reasonably matched with the visual artifact types. More complex and naturalistic designs are said to incorporate external nonbiologically derived information (a detailed drawing of a horse may incorporate one of the visual artifact types, but the horse form comes from outside the artisan). Would not simple designs be more likely matched always with the visual artifact types than complex ones? Here is where the issue of quantification enters.

In a given culture, who produces the rock art? The authors imply that shamans or individuals on vision quests were significantly involved. But no evidence is offered as to the ratio of visual artifact designs produced by nonshamans, particularly children and subadults, whom we could expect to be immature artisans and therefore producers of simpler designs. I rather suspect that the development of drawing in children is strongly correlated with neurological growth and development; at least that is my impression of children's drawings in several cultures I have experienced. I doubt very much that what children draw results from visual artifacts. And I know from experience among Hopi, Aleuts, and Russians as well as with my own daughters that children do practice rock or other surface art. How do we dis-

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criminate between possible shaman activity and the markings of children?

To begin with, designs need to be analyzed in depth to identify factors of treatment or form that would differentiate the productions of normal adults, altered-state adults, and subadults. There will be variation in the depictions of these three classes, so quantification has to be involved to provide some estimate of error. Context (i.e., deep caves or strange places) cannot be assumed without independent assessment to be a reasonable aid for discriminating between the rock-art productions of children and those influenced by visual artifacts, i.e., shamans'. Preservation needs to be factored in, since weathering could break down a complex design into a remnant simple-appearing one. Placement relative to the ground surface is another obvious variable, and so forth.

Quantitative data are also needed to evaluate the frequencies of the neurologically influenced types within a rock-art panel, between panels, and through time. In the Anasazi culture area where I have had some experience with rock art (Turner 1963, 1971), the earliest style is decidedly simplistic, and therefore all six of the visual artifact types can be recognized, and quite frequently. But these forms are style or tradition characteristics and hardly the result of only shaman activity, heavy drug use, or other determining factors. Coming up in time, Anasazi rock art becomes both more realistic and abstract, and the visual artifact types are much less readily identifiable. My point is that variation in the frequency of visual artifact types occurs through time and space. Consequently, statistical inference is obligatory for factoring out the different causes of convergent forms that must be considered before it is possible to get at the meaning of Paleolithic rock art. At least it is obligatory if we want to know the probability of discriminating between drawings by shamans and by children or between style and content.

If my comments appear overly critical, they are not intended to be. I applaud this very clever, highly creative, and scholarly effort at constructing a "neurological bridge" to the Paleolithic. I find the idea of visual artifacts' being an element in Paleolithic rock art intuitively satisfying. However, there is a big gap between this idea and a demonstration of its vitality, and this gap is the result of inadequate methodology. Such a demonstration can only be done by statistical inference beginning with some reasonable baseline such as averaged or weighted world or regional ethnographic analogies transformed to some sort of numerical scaling.

JOAN M. VASTOKAS

*Department of Anthropology, Trent University,
Peterborough, Ont., Canada K9J 7B8. 14 VIII 87*

Keeping up with Lewis-Williams's shifting methodologies is no mean task. Within a span of only six years, ethnographic analogy, symbolic analysis, Marxist social theory, and, now, neuropsychology have sequentially in-

formed his interpretations of southern San rock art and, most recently, that of the Upper Palaeolithic. This most recent exercise in the application of experimental psychological data by Lewis-Williams and his colleague Dowson to the problem of prehistoric art interpretation can only be commended. In agreement with Gestalt psychologist Rudolf Arnheim (1974:3), who says that "all seeing is in the realm of the psychologist," I think that insufficient attention has been paid so far to the investigation of actual artistic processes and products by experimental psychologists working not only in neuropsychology but in the various relevant fields of mental imagery, visual perception, dream research, and human response to visual stimuli. While it has not yet been demonstrated to the satisfaction of most art specialists, it is clear that a great deal of visual expression and observer response has a physiological basis, subject to the ever-present conditioning factors of culture and individual personality. Valid interpretation of artistic process in any society of necessity requires the cross-disciplinary cooperation of psychology, anthropology, and the history of art.

Lewis-Williams and Dowson hypothesize for Upper Palaeolithic "signs" what Reichel-Dolmatoff (1978b) had already discovered among the Tukano of Colombia, that drug-induced phosphenes were the visual sources of inspiration for almost their entire design repertoire. It is Reichel-Dolmatoff, too, who seems to have been the first to suggest that "it would not be difficult to find parallels to phosphene-derived design motifs in prehistoric . . . petroglyphs and pictographs" (p. 302). Perhaps this precedence should have been more obviously acknowledged by the authors. Their use of this Tukano material to help support the interpretation of Upper Palaeolithic painted "signs" as entoptic representations, it should be noted, contradicts their statement that "simplistic ethnographic analogy" is being avoided. Ethnographic evidence and analogy is in fact essential to their argument, that is, to the postulation that shamanic practices involving altered states prevailed in the Upper Palaeolithic and that the mental images experienced in those states were actually reproduced on cave walls. This comment is not to argue against the use of ethnographic analogy or to oppose the likelihood of some form of shamanism in the Upper Palaeolithic but merely to point out that ethnographic analogy and internal analysis are difficult to avoid where almost all contextual data are lacking. For any hope of success in understanding prehistoric art, what is needed is not a battle of theories and methodologies but cooperation among them.

While I support the use of experimental neurological and other psychological data for the interpretation of prehistoric art and, I might add, for the still undeveloped investigation of aesthetic universals, those data alone do not entirely "explain" the concrete visual images. The prime conditioning factors of culture as well as those of physical format, techniques of execution, and materials employed by the artist largely determine whether and how those ephemeral entoptic phenomena are actually represented on the cave walls.

As the authors state, phosphenes are experienced universally. But they are not universally represented. It is one thing to experience mental images; it is another to reproduce them in material form. It is difficult to accept the authors' suggestion that the Upper Palaeolithic artists may have projected their mental imagery and afterimages like so many slides onto the cave wall and "traced" them, "merely touching and marking *what was already there*." The passivity of subjects during trance does not allow for active production of art forms. "Recollected mental imagery," on the other hand, must be acknowledged as one of the sources of visual inspiration in prehistoric rock art. But, as in the case of the Tukanos, mental image recollections are conditioned by cultural as well as technical and environmental factors. That the cave walls as a physical environmental factor, for example, were not considered by the authors is clear. They seem to agree with Halverson's (1987:67) description of the painted images as "free-floating" and "independent of scene or surface."

Phosphenes may be "free-floating" in the vitreous humour of the eye, but painted images adhere and relate to particular surfaces, which often give evidence of having been deliberately selected, not arbitrarily "traced" upon because they just happened to be there. This selectivity is obvious in the case, for example, of the cluster of red dots on the ceiling at Pech-Merle, located not on the rough side walls but on the relatively smooth surface of the ceiling. This selectivity is even more evident in animal representations. The head of the spotted horse at the same site, for example, is fitted into and conforms to a similarly shaped rock projection (Pfeiffer 1982: pls. 13 and 14), and the plastic volumes of the clay bison at Tuc d'Audoubert conform visually to their rocky matrix in the center of the cave (pl. 12). The visual and evocative context of the site itself cannot be ignored as a source of inspiration. Indeed, in many cases, it is quite likely that the site is iconically prior to and ritually more important than the pictorial images with which it is covered. The visually suggestive crevices and seams of the prehistoric petroglyphs near Peterborough, Ontario, for example, clearly inspired images of female genitalia (Vastokas and Vastokas 1973:79-83).

It is quite likely that phosphenes, even in the Upper Palaeolithic, while passively received, were almost immediately afterward given cultural interpretations. Meaning would have had to be projected upon these mental phenomena before the artist could have felt any need to "fix" them permanently. Any practising artist can report that the critical step between imagined paintings and their actual execution on canvas or wall is the most crucial, requiring at least the planned presence of appropriate tools and materials, if not (in the case of Westerners) a lengthy sequence of experimentation in preliminary sketches and drawings. The point is that the creative interval lies between passivity ("getting an idea") and the completed action ("getting it down on canvas"), a process that is not automatic (not a case of "tracing" ideas) but subject always to the peculiarities of individual motor habits, background training (read "cul-

ture") with all its acquired conventions, and the behavioural vagaries of the artist's tools and materials.

While phosphenes may have served as visual sources in a number of circumstances throughout human history, interpretation of prehistoric art in terms of these neuropsychological phenomena should not be carried too far, as I am afraid the authors have done in the case of the Coso rock-art data. Viewed cross-culturally, the sources for image creation are immensely varied and difficult to disentangle when one considers the complexity of artistic processes. Shamanism and hallucinogenic phenomena seem to have been a fad with us in recent years, to the neglect of innumerable other considerations of equal importance to the interpretation of prehistoric and non-Western art forms.

One observation that needs making at this juncture is the neglect of the potential data that living artists can provide for a kind of "ethnographic analogy." If, indeed, there are any universals to be discovered in artistic processes and if the route to their determination lies in the various branches of experimental psychology, then psychologists, anthropologists, and prehistoric-art specialists should be doing research among living artists in Western as well as non-Western cultural contexts.

MICHAEL WINKELMAN

Cross-cultural Consultants, Irvine, Calif. 92716-4032, U.S.A. 21 VIII 87

Lewis-Williams and Dowson are to be commended for an informative cross-disciplinary synthesis of the neuropsychology of entoptic and hallucinatory phenomena with an analysis of the origin and significance of Palaeolithic and other cave and rock art. While the approach has limitations and shortcomings recognized by the authors, it makes an important contribution to the development of a biopsychological model of shamanic and related altered-state-of-consciousness activities. The explanation of these art forms as "products of altered states of consciousness and related neurologically based principles in the formation of mental images, informed by the functioning of the human nervous system," links their research with my work on the psychophysiology of altered states and the origins of shamanism (Winkelman 1986) showing that trance-induction techniques used cross-culturally include stimulation of aspects of the central nervous system that produce hallucinatory visual activity.

A biopsychological approach is useful not only for explaining the homogeneity of rock art and shamanic practices worldwide but also for addressing particular aspects of the art. The occurrence of Upper Palaeolithic art forms in deep caverns, for example, can be understood in terms of the trance-inducing properties of these locations, including sensory deprivation, temperature extremes, oxygen deprivation, physical immobility, and emotional manipulation (see Winkelman 1986).

The analysis of entoptic forms and the rules for their combination provides a useful alternative to views of

these art forms as reflecting cognitive deficits of primitive artists. An unaddressed issue is whether participation in the bizarre hallucinatory worlds and their depiction constitutes a parallel, equivalent, or inferior perceptual modality.

I question the usefulness of the notion of "stages in the development of mental imagery," especially since the authors themselves point out that the three stages are to be viewed as "cumulative rather than sequential." Although the model emphasizes a developmental-stage perspective, the discussion shows that this perspective is unnecessary, likely a product of Western evolutionary/developmental tendencies and the effort to order entoptic, iconic, and hallucinatory forms hierarchically.

The subsequent analyses suggested by Lewis-Williams and Dowson might more firmly establish the fundamental importance of entoptic forms and indicate the extent to which social and cultural factors affect their manifestations. A formal examination of the incidence of entoptic forms with respect to the entire range of forms presented would be valuable in this connection. Future questions include an assessment of the specific meanings or range of meanings ascribed to entoptic phenomena, sociocultural factors affecting the selection of or emphasis on specific entoptic phenomena, and the ways in which expectations may feed back into altered-state-induction procedures.

ALISON WYLIE

Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ont., Canada N6A 3K7. 24 VIII 87

The main virtue claimed for the "model" of rock art presented here is that it "reduces the inferential component" inherent in both "internal analyses" and analogical interpretation. The suggestion is that the "neurological bridge" makes it possible systematically to exploit external interpretive resources without engaging the unreliability of "simplistic" ethnographic analogy. In what follows, I want to draw attention to analogical elements that remain in the formulation of this model. Far from calling into question claims made for its plausibility or security, my aim is to elaborate the suggestion that reliance on analogical inference should not automatically give way to "ethnographic despair" when no single, complete analog for the subject is available. Sophisticated analogical argument across the sciences exploits a range of sources—the analogs involved are generally "multiply connected" (Harre 1970:49)—and establishes the relevance of these sources to the subject by demonstrating the existence of "determining structures" (Weitzenfeld 1984:143) that ensure, with some specifiable degree of reliability, that the association of compared with imputed attributes is not purely accidental. I suggest that the strength of the model proposed by Lewis-Williams and Dowson derives not so much from an elimination of inference as from an effective use of two quite different, mutually reinforcing sources which underwrite strong claims for the relevance of specific

similarities in visual imagery manifested in diverse contexts.

What "independent neuropsychological research" provides is a model of a cause—a constraining or generating factor—that is capable of producing certain visual imagery, imagery which is also associated, Lewis-Williams and Dowson argue, with the artistic expression of shamanistic traditions. Given the physiology of the human nervous system (or, indeed, that of many mammals), this cause is potentially operative in all human contexts. The power of the neurological link is, then, that it effectively eliminates uncertainty about whether the postulated causal factor could have been present, given its biophysical nature. Two questions remain, however, which are not settled by the neurological model itself: whether the causal factor cited was, in fact, operative in the contexts in question (did people in these contexts enter the altered states of consciousness in which their neurological systems could be expected to produce entoptic images?) and whether it played a role in the artistic tradition (did the rock art result from people's attempting to "fix" these particular images?).

In the San and Coso cases, it is possible to settle these questions ethnographically or ethnohistorically. These are cultural contexts that incorporate shamanistic traditions in which trances played a central role. The trances were valued in part for the visions associated with them; the rock art is known to be associated with shamanism, and there is some direct testimony that it embodies trance-induced visions. The background neurophysiological knowledge cited makes it possible to reconstruct, with a high degree of certainty, what sorts of images these neurologically induced visions would have incorporated. The crucial step in determining the "validity" of the model for Coso and San art is to demonstrate a correlation between these entoptic images and the content of the art; it is a matter of linking the model of images produced "within," as a function of the structure of our nervous system under trancelike conditions, with the images encountered in rock art. The existence of shamanism secures this connection as an enabling condition; it involves practices which ensure that some individuals (those producing the art) entered states of consciousness in which the postulated causal mechanism would have been activated (i.e., states in which they would have experienced the distinctive entoptic images described by the model). The relevance of this to the artistic tradition is then confirmed by demonstrating that the art embodies the same range of images as is distinctive of these altered states of consciousness.

When the model is extended to Upper Paleolithic art, I submit, it is by analogy, although not simply "formal" analogy that trades on contingent similarities between source and subject. The neurological source supplies, again, only information about the sorts of images the human nervous system is capable of producing when "altered" by sensory deprivation or drugs. The supposition that the minds of Upper Paleolithic artists were so altered and their art represents a "fixing" of visual sensations so induced is based on analogy to the San and Coso

cases; the "positive" analogy consists of striking similarities in the repertoire of images produced. The conclusion drawn is that they *are* entoptic images and are therefore further similar in being associated with shamanistic-like practices. The pivotal argument here is that the same "determining structure," specifically, the neurological structure that produces a delimited range of visual sensations under trancelike conditions, was responsible for the repertoire of images present in Upper Paleolithic art as in artistic traditions known to be shamanistic, those of the Coso and San. This is an argument that the presence of a particular repertoire of images is a "relevant" indicator that the postulated causal factors were present and operative as well. And it depends not solely on the neurophysical information about our capacity to experience entoptic sensations under certain conditions but, given the lack of any collateral evidence of direct connection, on a demonstration of the tightness of the link between the having of such experiences and the production of the associated artistic images.

On this analysis, then, the crucial, inference-securing, element of Lewis-Williams and Dowson's argument consists of the considerations they bring to bear in establishing that the rock art they discuss incorporates a repertoire of images sufficiently like entoptic or entoptic-iconic mixes of images produced neurologically under trancelike conditions and sufficiently unlike images that are or would be produced by other postulated "determining structures" (e.g., representational interests, the internal dynamic of evolving artistic skills and traditions) to be very likely to be entoptic images—the result of attempts to "fix" trance-induced entoptic images rather than of other conditions, intentions, or activities. The model is properly defended, on this account, as a "best explanation," and its strength derives both from the extensiveness of the "fit" between forms described by neurological research and forms evident in rock art and from its capacity to account for features of the subject which remain puzzling on alternative models (e.g., the juxtaposition of geometric and representational images). The model is "best" to the extent that the cited causes can be shown to be uniquely associated with the effects in question.

When the argument for Lewis-Williams and Dowson's model is considered in this light, a number of possibilities for further investigation suggest themselves. As an argument for a "best explanation," the case for the model is essentially comparative; further exploration of the strengths and limitations of alternative models would seem important for securing and perhaps refining it. Two strategies for strengthening analogical claims of relevance follow from the structure of the inference involved (Wylie 1985), both of which could be relevant in making this central comparative assessment. One is to press the demonstration of tightness of fit between source and subject (showing that it is unique to this model), and the other is to investigate the persistence and uniqueness of the connection between entoptic-like images in art and their experience in trancelike states in

a range of source contexts. Both call for broadening the range of sources on which the analogical portion of the argument is based. The former suggests the value of devising methods for systematically measuring and comparing degree of fit to demonstrate that it is not accidental. The latter directs attention to cross-context comparisons designed to determine whether distinctive entoptic forms and entoptic-iconic mixes of forms routinely (or always) occur in art associated with trance- or altered-state-inducing practices and whether, by way of seeking counterexamples, they ever occur (or with what frequency they occur) in artistic traditions associated with no such experience. Where it is recognized that nonneurological factors play a role in the iconic interpretation of entoptic images in the second and third stages, and even in the first stage, where "expectation" may "sharpen" the perception of some entoptics rather than others, it would also be useful to determine the consistency and isolate the degree of plasticity of "form constants," transformation principles, and stage sequence across "altered states of consciousness" induced in different ways, under divergent cultural conditions (e.g., associated with cults or religious traditions of diverse content or with secular practices in which the images have no particular conventionally defined significance).

All these possibilities for strengthening the argument take a common question as their point of departure: What would count as disconfirmation of the model? More concretely: How clearly diagnostic are the "effects" of the particular causal factor postulated in the present model? What is the likelihood that they could be produced by other causal factors? It will depend on the circumstances of research in several different fields—neurophysiology, ethnography, archaeology—whether any or many of these questions can be fruitfully pursued. It is a significant strength of the present model, however, that it not only provides an initially compelling account of puzzling, seemingly "anarchic" phenomena but so clearly opens up new lines of inquiry.

Reply

J. D. LEWIS-WILLIAMS AND T. A. DOWSON
Johannesburg, South Africa. 16 XI 87

As a number of commentators point out, the topic we address impinges on several specialist fields: psychology, neurology, archaeology, art history, and philosophy. Vastokas, who is clearly aware of this complexity, remarks on the "shifting methodologies" one of us (JDL-W) has employed in the past. The reason for this diversity is that method and theory must be appropriate to the question. This places a burden on rock-art researchers, and we are, therefore, grateful that representatives of various fields have taken the trouble to comment. Their remarks raise three comparatively minor points, some unfortu-

nate misunderstandings, a methodological problem, and two major philosophical issues. In our response, we address these topics in this order.

The first minor issue concerns our use of "shaman." Consens notes that we use the word to include the "lone visionary of the Siberians and the collective Tukano," and Halverson rightly concludes that, in the limited sense we propose, "virtually anyone could have been a shaman." As we stated, we mean only to imply persons in hunter-gatherer societies who enter altered states of consciousness to perform various curing and supernatural functions. Whether such persons are solitary or common (as with the San) is immaterial to our present argument, though we believe it may be necessary to draw this distinction at a later stage.

A second minor point is the place of therianthropes in shamanistic art. Mirimanov claims that they are "definitely not the result of hallucinations" and that "what little we know about rock art yields no evidence as to any shamanistic origin for these paintings." We cannot speak for the Sahara, but there is now little doubt that the San examples are hallucinatory (see our footnotes 3 and 4). In one of the few direct comments on San rock paintings a 19th-century San informant said, in a series of San metaphors, that they were men in trance (Lewis-Williams 1980), and the statement by James's subject about turning into a fox shows that zoomorphic transformation can indeed be part of trance experience. In any event, clearly painted fetlocks and hoofs as well as the fact that some are half-animal and half-human prelude their being human beings in disguise. More interestingly, Bahn asks why they are not more abundant in European Upper Palaeolithic art. In fact, a similar position obtains in southern Africa, where, in one area, there are 6,321 human and 3,942 animal depictions but only 88 therianthropes (Pager 1971:321). Although some commentators do not recognise it, we draw attention to the importance of cultural selection in explaining emphases and omissions in various arts. The San, for instance, selected certain animals for frequent depiction and ignored others; similarly, some societies emphasize certain entoptic phenomena and ignore others. The Tukano, in an indisputably shamanistic art, have very few therianthropes. The comparative paucity of therianthropes in a number of shamanistic arts certainly requires more detailed explanation, but it does not count against a shamanistic explanation.

The last minor point concerns the origin of certain ideas. Bednarik remarks on "[his] theorem" and "another crucial proposition of [his]," while Halverson thinks we should have accorded Bednarik "a good deal more recognition" and Davis believes we "do not really engage" Bednarik's work. Although debates of this kind can become unseemly, credit must certainly be given where it is due. We merely point out that we did not know of Bednarik's work until the southern African work was far advanced (cf. Thackeray et al. 1981; Maggs and Sealy 1983; Lewis-Williams 1984c, 1985a; see Bednarik [1986b:165] himself on this point) and, much more important, that he makes so little of the formal parallels

he notes that there is very little in his work we wish to "engage" at this juncture. In any event, Eichmeier and Höfer's (1974) more penetrating study preempted him by ten years, and Reichel-Dolmatoff's (1972, 1978a, 1978b) even earlier seminal ethnographic work with the Tukano has not been bettered. Then, just over a decade ago, Blackburn (1977:93), in another paper we cited, observed parallels between Chumash design elements and entoptic forms and urged researchers to "learn more . . . about the biopsychological aspects of the art and the intervening cultural screen, and about the process of interaction between the two." As far as we know, no one has heeded Blackburn's advice and gone much beyond reporting formal parallels. Thus, as Davis remarks, the idea that entoptic phenomena may be depicted in various arts "has been around for some time now." We acknowledged this by citing a number of papers, some of which Davis cites again. Neither Bednarik nor we can claim precedence for observing isomorphism between entoptic phenomena and certain rock-art depictions, and we were careful to avoid making such a claim. The important point is that the noting of formal parallels between entoptic phenomena and certain graphic images is, in itself, not sufficiently illuminating: it needs to be developed and incorporated into a comprehensive model that can become part of a more complex argument. Bednarik's failure to develop such a model can perhaps be attributed to his misunderstanding of analogy (see below) and his belief that "semantics are among the trivial aspects of early marking traditions, that derivation is the real issue" (Bednarik 1986b:163), and that changing social circumstances are a "feeble construct" (see, for example, Conkey 1980, Gamble 1983, and White 1985 on this last point). If Bednarik had not been hampered by these misunderstandings, he would not have found some interpretive aspects of our paper "surprisingly plausible."

There are, in addition to these minor points, two misunderstandings we must rectify. First, Bednarik believes we claim that "entoptic phenomena and iconic hallucinations have always coexisted." In fact, we claim only that their association is remarkably widespread in rock art. Moreover, we adduce evidence that the earliest markings are exclusively entoptic and argue that at "the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic there was an intensification of production, an apparent increase in the artists' entoptic repertoire, the addition of representational images, and, quite possibly, a new desire for durable depictions."

The second misunderstanding, exemplified by Vastokas, is our fault rather than hers. In a badly phrased sentence we appeared to claim that Upper Palaeolithic depictions are always independent of their support. We intended to say only that many (but not all) iconic images are depicted without ground lines or surroundings and that they are often grouped so that they appear to be quite independent of one another. Certainly, very large numbers of images are associated with the form of the rock wall, and we are grateful to Vastokas for citing examples.

Important methodological issues arise from some commentators' emphasis on traditional strategies for rock-art research. Consens, for instance, believes the establishment of (probably stylistic) sequences and regions and quantitative analyses are "standard procedure." This is a manifestation of the empiricist position that researchers should collect all data, classify them, and then induce explanations from them. Turner also expresses this view when he defends induction of meaning from numerical rock-art data by asking, "How many times a day does a scientist say: 'What these data mean is that . . .?'" Contrary to his expectation, data do not speak, indeed cannot speak, to the researcher in this way. Whatever he may believe he is doing, the researcher formulates hypotheses and applies them to the data; in other words, the *ideas* come from the researcher, not the data (Chalmers 1978). Still more seriously, which of the multitude of possible observations qualify as data, and how should they be classified or analysed? For data to be collected in the first place they must be deemed relevant to some hypothesis; not even supposed "raw data" can be theory-free. If, as in a gross but not imaginary example, painted "scenes" are categorized as walking, hunting, dancing, fighting, domestic, mythical, and ceremonial groups, the results will show that a certain percentage of the art is secular and a certain percentage "religious." But, because each of the categories is itself an interpretation based on the assumptions that such groups are evident upon inspection and that the art is partly secular and partly religious, the general result is inevitable. All the accompanying numbers and statistics merely lend a "scientific" flavour to the work. As Shanks and Tilley (1987:59) remark, "For mathematization meaning is a meaning-less question. This is the inevitable conclusion to a belief in the objectivity of precision and calculability." Thus the numerical inventories Turner advocates reflect not "objective" criteria but criteria that the researcher deems potentially significant in terms of his or her (perhaps tacit) hypothesis and that are therefore already skewed. As we ourselves have found, numerical inventories must of necessity omit important criteria of which the researcher is ignorant at the time of collection.

Because of these problems, quantification not surprisingly plays hardly any significant role in Turner's own work. In his comment he says, "Statistical inference is obligatory for factoring out the different causes of convergent forms," but in his study of the Glen Canyon petroglyphs he defines styles subjectively, not statistically [for example, "a poorly-executed outline," "naturalistic designs are poorly done," "falls short of the quality of Style 4 imagery" (Turner 1963:6)]. Similarly, when he comes to "possible motivations for petroglyphs" he writes, "some individual petroglyphs, and two panels composed of several different designs both representational and non-representational, have 'struck' me the way some abstract paintings have done. Though meaningless, they are *to my mind* as they should be" (p. 29, emphasis added). He also says, "Interpretation of realistic forms probably will give as close a guess about

actual meaning as is possible" (p. 22, emphasis added). He thus shows that the ideas are in fact coming from himself, not from the data, and he effectively excludes statistical inference from the formulation of explanations of meaning.

These examples illustrate some of the problems with traditional empiricist rock-art research: it is committed to a false notion of "science" and consequently seldom gets beyond descriptive inventories and, in the very nature of its method, cannot produce persuasive results (for more on empiricism in rock-art research, see Lewis-Williams and Loubser 1986). Because we do not adopt the traditional empiricist approach, the form of our argument is a problem for a number of commentators. Consens, for instance, characterises it as "a pseudo-epistemological approach" comprising "a mixture of axioms, assertions, and beliefs." To show that this extravagant charge betrays a tenuous hold on logic in general and, in particular, on the progression of our argument, we now address the nature of proof and the structure of our argument.

On the matter of proof, Davis writes of "downright unproved assertion," and Bahn claims that our argument "in no way proves that Palaeolithic meanings fell within that range." As philosophers of science have amply demonstrated, this is a grave misunderstanding (see, e.g., Chalmers 1978). Proof is a concept appropriate only to mathematics and unimpeachable deductive arguments. A call for proof is therefore inappropriate in rock-art research, and researchers must use forms of argument appropriate to the human sciences.

A number of commentators raise the converse problem of disconfirmation. Davis, for instance, says that without an element of disconfirmation our explanation is "impossible to evaluate." What element in an art could be shown to preclude an explanation derived from altered states of consciousness (ASC)? Such an argument would run:

If x , then not ASC,

where x is a feature of the content, or perhaps context, of an art. Although we note that our model does not elucidate all Upper Palaeolithic signs, the difficulty here is, of course, defining x . At present part of our argument runs:

If $y_1, y_2, y_3 \dots$, then ASC.

But, because we do not yet know the complete range of y 's, it is hard to be sure that a supposed x will not, upon further research, turn out to be a y or, at any rate, a non-restricting factor. This has in fact been our experience with southern African rock art. At one time some writers thought that the so-called narrative scenes apparently depicting fights, hunts, and so forth, could not be derived from trance experience. Since then it has been shown that such events are also part of trance experience, and, as other painted features often confirm, there is every reason to believe that the supposed x in this case is not an x at all (Lewis-Williams 1984c; Campbell 1986, 1987). In any event, the observation statements that constitute supposed x 's are themselves theory-laden. They

have to be made in the language of some theory and are therefore as fallible as the theories they presuppose; they are not "given" and not as secure as they are popularly believed to be (Chalmers 1976:25-30; Hempel 1966:12). Because observation statements are fallible, they cannot conclusively falsify a hypothesis. As long as there is uncertainty about establishing unequivocal x's we shall not be able to formulate disconfirmations. This, however, is not the end of research; incontrovertible disconfirmations are difficult to formulate in many archaeological areas, but that does not inhibit research. Indeed, rock-art research is in good company; many scientific disciplines operate outside the rigidly demarcated areas of proof and disconfirmation. As in similarly placed disciplines, we shall have to work with "best-fit" hypotheses. Philosophers of science have proposed criteria whereby hypotheses may be judged (e.g., Copi 1968, Hempel 1966), and these have been used in rock-art research (Lewis-Williams 1983a, Lewis-Williams and Loubser 1986). They include quantity of data explained, diversity of data explained, testability, heuristic and predictive potential, and compatibility with well-established research.

The evaluation of hypotheses in the absence of "proof" is a major feature of our argument. To show where it fits in we now adumbrate the principal stages of our argument, at the same time addressing other comments relevant to these stages.

Our argument begins with the construction of a neuropsychological (rather than "neurophysiological") model of mental imagery in altered states of consciousness. This model is derived entirely from neuropsychological research, not from rock art; its validity can be questioned only by neuropsychological research. We do not see in what way it is "tendentious" (Davis), and we certainly do not, as Bednarik claims, use "0.03% of the world's surviving rock art" as a "basis for identifying universal trends." A misunderstanding of this magnitude explains why, for Bednarik, our argument "becomes progressively less convincing as [our] model is developed." The kind of universality we propose derives not from Upper Palaeolithic art but from neuropsychological research alone (cf. Winkelman's [1986] important work on the neuropsychological basis of shamanism). There is thus no tautology as Bahn charges. The structure of the human nervous system establishes a potential for entoptic phenomena that is universal. Examination of Upper Palaeolithic art reveals similar forms, and this, together with other points, suggests strongly that these forms are entoptic in origin. We certainly do not, as Bahn claims, start our argument by *assuming* that Palaeolithic signs are entoptic images.

The usefulness of our model, especially the notion of stages in the development of mental imagery, is questioned by Winkelman. However, the fact that the Tukano recognise comparable stages in their own experience shows that the model is not entirely "a product of Western evolutionary/developmental tendencies and the effort to order entoptic, iconic, and hallucinatory forms hierarchically." Moreover, the model elucidates

the hitherto inexplicable relationship between iconic and geometric rock-art images. This alone establishes its explanatory power.

Having constructed the model, we assess its utility by applying it to two known shamanistic rock arts. At this point Layton expresses the view that our two shamanistic rock arts (we resolved to stay with rock art and to ignore other shamanistic art forms) are "poorly documented," and Vastokas, Faulstich, and Consens, in contrast to Bahn, question whether there is sufficient evidence to accept Coso rock art as shamanistic. In the first place, we believe that San rock art is adequately documented; our footnote 3 provides references to a wealth of evidence and also answers Consens's misapprehension that we "disregard previous criticism." Secondly, we turned to Coso rock art because it was from a different continent and because there is evidence that it too is shamanistic. To allay misgivings on this point we have asked Whitley to outline some important new evidence (see below).

When we apply our model to these two arts, we avoid the obvious pitfall of identifying any squiggle as an entoptic image; we do not "come close to admitting" (Davis) that any mark can be interpreted as entoptic. Application of our *complete model* to drawings made by chimpanzees (Morris 1962:figs. 6-9, 48, 49, reproduced by Davis 1986a:fig. 7) shows quite clearly that the model does exclude some "arts." We point not just to the six entoptic forms we selected but also to combinations and transformations of these forms by definable principles (also derived from neuropsychology, not from the art itself) and to the juxtapositioning, superpositioning, and combination of entoptic and iconic images (as the neuropsychological model predicts). Because our model in this way makes sense of images in San and Coso art, our confidence in its utility increases (note that we do not claim to have "proved" the model in any sense), and we are encouraged to apply it to Upper Palaeolithic art.

It is at this point, Wylie contends, that we proceed analogically. Bednarik castigates us because we "fail to jettison ethnographic analogy . . . at the right moment" (whenever that might be), and Halverson writes of "a shameless appeal to analogy" (cf. Vastokas on our use of Tukano material). Because these and similar comments reflect a general and serious misunderstanding in rock-art research, they deserve close consideration. Near the beginning of our paper we express the belief that our argument reduces the inferential element that looms so large in arguments from internal analyses and, at the same time, avoids *simplistic* ethnographic analogy (see also Lewis-Williams and Loubser 1986:262-64). We do not claim to be eliminating inference or analogy. We are, therefore, especially grateful to Wylie, a philosopher of science, for her thoughtful and detailed examination of our use of analogy. Unlike other commentators, she does not reject analogy out of hand. Instead she elaborates "the suggestion that reliance on analogical inference should not automatically give way to 'ethnographic despair' when no single, complete analog for the subject is

available." We take her acceptance of our argument as vindication in the face of the criticism to which we now turn.

Layton asks if our use of analogy is any less simplistic than Breuil's. To answer this question we must first consider the kind of simplistic analogy one of us has criticised elsewhere (Lewis-Williams and Loubser 1986). In such an analogy, Pager (1975b:80) cites an Australian Aboriginal ritual using a rope fringed with white feathers to explain the sinuous red line fringed with white dots that sometimes links depictions in San rock art. He concludes, "Without asking for possible reasons for such a striking parallel one might just accept that the same explanation fits the extraordinary rock art scenes." This is the kind of (false) analogy employed by Breuil and others. In contrast to it, Wylie (1985; see also Salmon 1982:62-63) describes a form of analogy that depends on relations of relevance. The concept of relevance implies a causal or determining effect between properties in the source of an analogy. In other words, the source exhibits two properties, A and B, and it can be shown that causal, functional, or some other close connection exists between them. It follows that, if the subject of the analogy also exhibits A, it is reasonable to accept that the same relational mechanism exists in the subject and that, consequently, B is also present.

In archaeological research it is difficult in practice to establish strong relations of relevance that are not trivial. Archaeological analogy extends an argument from the ethnographic present into a new domain, the distant past, in which we cannot always be sure that the same mechanisms existed. In other words, Upper Palaeolithic social formations may have been so different from any of those observed ethnographically or historically that we cannot consider them to exhibit the same principles of relevance. We believe that our argument at least partially overcomes this objection and comes close to establishing strong relations of relevance. In the first place, a review of these comments shows that our proposition that the nervous system of Upper Palaeolithic people responded in certain altered states in ways closely similar to modern people's seems not to be generally or seriously disputed. There is, moreover, a relation of relevance between activation of the nervous system in altered states and entoptic phenomena. The presence in Upper Palaeolithic art of geometric forms very similar to entoptic phenomena, combinations of entoptic and iconic forms, and a range of predictable transformations imply, through this relation of relevance, altered states of consciousness comparable with the shamanistic San and Coso ones that produced geometric rock art. This brief analysis shows that our argument is demonstrably "less simplistic than Breuil's" and supplies what Layton calls the "missing step" that enables us to assess the strength of our analogy against others'.

From here on our argument develops as a "best-fit" hypothesis. Although we headed the final section "Implications," it is more than that. We actually provide additional argument for our explanation by showing that it makes sense of other puzzling features of rock art,

such as the widespread association of geometric and iconic depictions and the origins of art. In achieving these further explanations of data, we believe our model is more empirically adequate.

It is in the light of "best-fit" considerations that the alternative explanations some commentators advance must be assessed. The one we find most thought-provoking and best-argued (though ultimately inadequate) is Martindale's. We do, of course, allow that art may derive from "mildly altered states such as hypnagogic states, reverie, and fantasy," but we part company with him when he goes on to argue that "'signs' can arise from normal perception if one attends to the featural level rather than to the level of unitary percepts" and that this would account for Upper Palaeolithic art if the artists' goal was the same as that of children, who attend to only "basic features" of the "optic array." Acceptance of Martindale's hypothesis would entail, in part, showing how and why they derived these particular "building blocks" from their veridical perceptions. Further, we believe that the long association of entoptic forms with often remarkably "realistic" iconic depictions, various kinds of combinations of entoptic and iconic forms, and combinations of iconic images (therianthropes), together with evidence for complex Upper Palaeolithic social forms, are better explained by the more extreme varieties of altered consciousness associated with shamanism than by infantile perception. Interesting as Martindale's hypothesis is, we consider it less successful as a "best-fit" hypothesis; it does not, we submit, cover as many data as ours. Mirimanov's suggestion that "the recurrence of simple forms may be kinetic in origin, that is, brought about by monotonous movement" and the suggestion of a number of commentators that entoptic forms may have been the work of children must both be rejected for the same reasons.

In contrast to these alternative hypotheses, Davis believes that his explanation for the origin of art "must underwrite" ours. Simply put, Davis's argument begins with the proposition that natural and human-made marks are sometimes perceptually ambiguous or, more broadly, have the capacity to be optical illusions. A linear shadow or black mark, for instance, may be mistaken for a deep groove, and the duality of the perception it affords would have been empirically ascertainable to early people. From this fundamental proposition Davis argues that it was inevitable that humankind would eventually tumble to iconicity and the representation of three dimensions on plane surfaces: "The more you mark, the more likely you will be to produce at some point a mark which potentially will be seen, by you or by someone else, as a thing" (Davis 1986a:200). This potential becomes, with the increasing sum of marks, so strong that representational marking is predictable (p. 201).

Whilst it is, as we have shown, difficult to disconfirm such a hypothesis, its inadequacies are demonstrable. In the first place, we are uneasy about inevitabilist arguments. Davis's hypothesis recalls monkeys, typewriters, and Shakespeare sonnets. It seems from the Mousterian

evidence that early people were making (entoptic) marks before the Upper Palaeolithic (for a recent review of Middle Palaeolithic symbolism, see Chase and Dibble 1987). It also seems inescapable that social forms must have developed at the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic that provided a niche for the practice, for, without an appropriate social framework, representation would not have "taken off" as it did at that time. Thus, while it may be true that some marks are intrinsically perceptually ambiguous, there was nothing inevitable about the "discovery" of representation. At this point Davis's hypothesis could be saved by dropping the inevitabilist component and substituting a social explanation to explain the increased value of exploiting perceptual ambiguity at the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic were it not for the fundamental problem that his explanation is very close to the old idea that early people perceived iconicity in random marks and patches on a wall (Gombrich 1961). Even if some of those marks were ambiguous, it does not explain why or how that ambiguity came to be seen, by a major extension, to represent, say, an animal. The illusion of depth that a dark black line may give would not, we believe, have "predictably resulted in the emergence of the specifically representational mark through seeing marks as things" (Davis 1986a:201).

Davis's hypothesis has an even more serious limitation. Although he refers to Aurignacian markings, they do not play a major part in his argument. He likens them to "modern telephone-pad doodling" that does not "initially or necessarily possess but may quickly acquire meanings" (Davis 1986a:197). The fact that these early people made marks is more important to him than their form. But, as we have shown, these marks are less random than Davis allows; they can readily be seen as part of a long entoptic tradition. As his argument proceeds, Davis concentrates on representations of three-dimensional items in two dimensions and ignores the signs that accompany (in some sites exceed) iconic depictions throughout the Upper Palaeolithic. The intimate and long-lived relationship between these two apparently different kinds of depiction cannot be ignored. By dropping consideration of signs once representation is established Davis turns his back on a crucial feature of Upper Palaeolithic art and, in effect, relegates the signs to their old position as precursors of iconicity, even though they persisted throughout the Upper Palaeolithic. Clearly, in terms of the criteria for hypothesis evaluation, an explanation that covers signs and representations will be preferable to one that explains just one or the other. We argue that our hypothesis does this (1) by at one level combining the two classes of depiction (both derive from mental imagery), (2) by explaining the forms the signs take, and (3) by explaining why and how signs and representations are associated throughout the Upper Palaeolithic. Our hypothesis is thus more comprehensive than Davis's; acceptance of ours makes his redundant.

More specifically, Davis sees his explanation as underwriting ours in offering a better explanation for the origin of image making than our notion of fixing projected mental images (see also Halverson and Vastokas).

Davis's use of "projection" here seems to differ from his use of it elsewhere (Davis 1986a:199). As Halverson recognises, "projection" can refer either to the projection of meaning onto natural marks like cracks or stains on a wall (Gombrich 1961) or to the visual projection of the image itself. We propose visual projection, not semantic projection onto preexisting marks, natural or human-made. We cannot be sure at present if projected iconic and entoptic mental images traced on a wall or floor were, for Upper Palaeolithic people, those images or whether they were intended to remind people of them, that is, accepted as references to mental imagery. We suspect that, initially, they were mental images and that reference developed along with socially produced images.

Either way, "the implication is that they knew they were depicting mental images" (Halverson). Present uncertainty on this point does not, however, seem to be as serious as Davis believes; it is a secondary question. Similarly, the action of fixing projected images was probably also less complex than Davis allows. He recommends trying to trace one's face in a cloudy mirror. The three-dimensionality of the mirror, of course, makes this a tricky task. But tracing a projected colour slide is comparatively easy, and it is to this that laboratory subjects liken projected mental imagery (Siegel and Jarvik 1975:109; Siegel 1977:134). We do not suggest that the act of tracing was "automatic." On the contrary, we believe that projected entoptic and iconic mental imagery, like that of the Tukano (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978a:8), was a "natural" part of early people's experience. Then, with the development of certain kinds of social relations (still to be elucidated), these images became more significant, as they have for the Tukano, and there was a growing desire to touch and fix them. As the fragmentary evidence shows, some fixing did take place before the Upper Palaeolithic. Although, as other commentators point out, this process requires more explication, it seems to us to explain early marking better than Davis's account because it explains the forms of early images and shows the origin of signs and representations to have been in a single experience. We therefore do not believe that his explanation necessarily underwrites ours.

This kind of evaluation is the final part of an argument that proceeds by clear stages: construction of a model, assessment of its utility, application of the model to Upper Palaeolithic art, and, finally, evaluation of alternative hypotheses. We do not claim to prove anything; we merely offer a hypothesis that we believe explains more, and more varied, data than competing hypotheses, is compatible with well-established research, and has predictive and heuristic potential. It awaits modification, refinement, or rejection when it fails to fulfil these criteria. As numerous commentators including Clegg and Faulstich note, our model's explanatory potential must be assessed against other rock arts, and the points that it raises but does not fully resolve must be followed up. Winkelman and Davis, for instance, rightly recommend an assessment of the sociocultural factors affecting the

selection of or emphasis on specific entoptic phenomena, while Vastokas urges research among living Western and non-Western artists. An important point here is that a hypothesis does not have to explain *all* data instantly before it can be adopted; in the absence of the misleading notion of proof, it has only to explain more data better than competing hypotheses. It then provides a platform for addressing outstanding issues. We argue that our explanation for the signs and other features of Upper Palaeolithic art is, at the present stage of research, the "best fit," and this seems to be accepted by many commentators. We extend our thanks to them, for their often very generously phrased remarks, and no less to our critics, who have pointed to numerous promising avenues for further research.

DAVID S. WHITLEY

Rock Art Research Unit, University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 2050, South Africa.

17 XI 87

A number of commentators have questioned Lewis-Williams and Dowson's use of the Coso rock engravings as an example of shamanic art, arguing that this has not been established. Because this contention is based on my as yet unpublished work (Whitley n.d.c), the authors have asked me to respond directly to this concern. I oblige by briefly summarizing here conclusions I have reached concerning the rock art of the Coso region and environs.

Although not widely recognized as such, there are numerous ethnographic references to rock-art production in the western Great Basin. These provide a clear and coherent indication of the creators of the art. Historically, however, rock-art researchers (and some ethnographers) have overlooked these references or have undertaken only a superficial examination of the linguistic glosses attached to them. For example, Voegelin (1938:61) dismissed the purported creators of Tubatulabal rock art, the *yahi iwal*, "water babies," as "brownies." Yet she subsequently noted *yahi iwal* as sometimes seen in jimsonweed (*Datura* spp.) trances and reported that they were a shaman's dream helpers and had a predilection for tobacco. Similarly, Zigmond (1977:71) recorded the *ʔuwan ʔazi*, "rock babies," as responsible for Kawaiisu rock art and noted that a hearing or sighting of one of these supernatural beings was an "omen of death" (a metaphor for trance in the region [cf. Zigmond 1980:33, n. 1]). Rock or water babies, in other words, were not considered inconsequential dwarfish "brownies" or "hobgoblins" in western Great Basin culture. Rather, they were supernatural beings imbued with power and closely tied to shamanism. Indeed, throughout the western Great Basin the "water baby" served as one of the most important and potent of the shaman's spirit or dream helpers (cf. Park 1938:15, 76-79; Downs 1961:366-67; Siskin 1983:23; Miller 1983:75). Thus, among the Uto-Aztecan-speaking Tubatulabal (Voegelin 1938:61), Kawaiisu (Driver 1937:86; Zigmond 1977:68,

71; Sutton 1982:151), Chemehuevi (Laird 1976:103, 123; 1984:302), and Coso Shoshone (Driver 1937:86, 126; Irwin 1980:32), ethnographic informants consistently and unanimously referred to rock art as made by shamans' spirit helpers.

Shamanism in the western Great Basin was closely tied to the ingestion of psychotomimetic plants, especially native tobacco; supernatural power for the principal shamanic function, curing, was derived from "dreaming" related to the ingestion of the psychotomimetics; and this power was manifest or embodied in the spirit or dream helper (cf. Steward 1933, Driver 1937, Park 1938, Voegelin 1938, Kelly 1939, Laird 1976, Zigmond 1977, Siskin 1983). Why did ethnographic informants consistently refer to the creators of the rock art as spirit/dream helpers? Two reasons can be suggested. First, the actions of this helper were inseparable from those of the shaman (and vice versa); dream, shaman, and helper were semantically, metonymically, and epistemologically equivalent (cf. Applegate 1978:27, 91; Siskin 1983:22). Second, as is suggested by Laird (1984:302), mentioning the names of the dead was generally proscribed, and it may well have been convenient (and culturally preferable) for informants to refer to the artists in terms of their spirit helpers rather than to specify the dead shamans themselves. The ethnographic references, thus, are not opaque in their attributions of the art; they must simply be interpreted within their cultural contexts, and they are unqualified and uncontradicting in linking the art to shamans.

A deeper examination of western Great Basin linguistics provides a second confirmation of the link between the rock art and shamanism. This is found in John Wesley Powell's Numic (Uto-Aztecan) texts and word lists, recorded between 1868 and 1880. Powell listed the word for "shaman" (derived throughout the region from the cognate for supernatural power, *poa*; cf. Miller 1972:130) in his orthography as *poagunt*. Significantly, he translated this as both "medicine man" and "a man who writes" (Fowler and Fowler 1971:144-45), that is, a man who writes on rocks (cf. Kerr's Coso Shoshone informant, Charlie Wrinkle, who consistently referred to rock engravings as "rock writings" [Irwin 1980:32]), emphasizing the importance in rock-art research, once again, of going beyond the superficial linguistic glosses of the existing ethnographies.

Given the increasing evidence for historic rock engravings in the Coso Range and western Great Basin (Whitley and Dorn 1987), we have a firm link between the ethnographies and the makers of the art. Because this ethnography provides a clear indication of the shamanic origins of the art and the relationship of shamanism to dreaming and the ingestion of hallucinogens, Lewis-Williams and Dowson's argument for entoptic phenomena within the Coso corpus rests on firm ground. Further, the situation in this region illustrates that there is much to be gained from a reexamination of ethnography vis-à-vis rock art (cf. Whitley 1982), even in a region (like eastern California) argued by many to be devoid of relevant or useful ethnographic references.

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