

the Trail of Broken Treaties. Kelland's subjects understood the connections between historical practice and identity; this shines through in the material they left behind. Kelland also completed oral histories as part of the project, which result in the details that bring their work to life: the importance of maintaining personal relationships, the division of labor, and the interconnectedness and inspiration between separate movements.

This brings me, finally, to the self-reflexivity of this book. If Kelland is making a claim for movement history—for active involvement in memory practices that help inform interventions and efforts on other planes—one can say she is doing the same for public history—itself a kind of movement. For scholar-practitioners who want to see examples of sharing authority, radical archiving, community-based practice, and commitment to accessibility that informs contemporary public history theory and practice, it is here in these case studies. For that reason, *Clio's Foot Soldiers* is a book that will teach well, either excerpted as case studies alongside readings on these social movements or in undergraduate and graduate public history and public humanities coursework. The “memory practices” detailed by Kelland both model and inspire.

M. J. RYMSZA-PAWLOWSKA
American University

MATTHEW ORAM. *The Trials of Psychedelic Therapy: LSD Psychotherapy in America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018. Pp. ix, 269. Cloth \$49.95.

According to most histories, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a pharmaceutical whose therapeutic potential was dashed by controversies concerning countercultural drug use and covert government research. In contrast to familiar accounts of a rapid government crackdown on the drug, Matthew Oram's *The Trials of Psychedelic Therapy: LSD Psychotherapy in America* describes the conclusion of scientific research on psychedelics as a “quiet death” of gradual bureaucratic cuts (183). Psychedelic therapy is a treatment that, by definition, involves personal and contextual factors that cannot be easily controlled, and devising a placebo for a psychedelic experience is inherently difficult. Yet for over a decade funders and regulators rationalized cuts to psychedelic research by demanding that studies conform to the standard of the randomized clinical trial—a design that rose to prominence in the mid-twentieth century with the investigation of nonpsychiatric pharmaceuticals such as antibiotics (100). Drawing on fresh primary source material, both published and archival, Oram demonstrates that psychedelic therapy research did not end abruptly with the restrictions placed on LSD by the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, but instead continued well into the mid-1970s. Oram argues that understanding the drawn-out decline of

LSD research in the twentieth century is essential to contemporary debates about psychedelic therapy's revival. In addition to being relevant to recent discussions regarding LSD's therapeutic potential, *The Trials of Psychedelic Therapy* provides an enduring examination of the ways in which researchers struggled to maintain legitimacy throughout a scientific paradigm shift and cultural crisis.

“Psychedelic therapy” is a technical term for one type of research involving hallucinogens that emerged during the 1950s (3). Psychedelic therapy research later surpassed “psychotomimetic” research, which sought to use LSD to reveal the biological origins of psychotic illness, and “psycholytic” research, which aimed to use LSD to better access the unconscious in psychodynamic talk therapy sessions. In contrast, “psychedelic,” or “mind manifesting,” therapy used the drug to induce a “transformative, subjective” experience that could lead to breakthroughs in talk therapy and lasting changes in behavior (15–16).

In presenting the “full story of LSD's medical use,” Oram's narrative revolves around psychiatrists Charles Savage, Albert Kurland, and Jerome Levine (7). The decision to focus on scientific researchers rather than on the public figures who have figured most prominently in the stories of LSD to date, such as authors Aldous Huxley, Ken Kesey, and psychologist Timothy Leary, makes a significant contribution to social and cultural histories of LSD's fall, in which “medical use transforms into nonmedical use, leaving medical use behind” (5). Other scholars, such as Erika Dyck, have described challenges with evaluating LSD's efficacy through clinical trials in Canada. *The Trials of Psychedelic Therapy* shows how a similar dynamic played out in the United States as researchers attempting to build on promising Canadian studies were ultimately thwarted by their own designs.

Charles Savage, a leading psychedelic therapy researcher, presciently argued that the double-blind, placebo-controlled trial was ill-suited to LSD research in 1955. He was the first to claim that both the patient's mind-set—personality, motivation, and expectations—and the experimental setting—environmental stressors and interpersonal interactions—influenced the success of the therapy. Researchers therefore needed to pay attention to variables such as the training of psychotherapists, the timing of LSD administration in the course of psychotherapy treatment, the physical space in which LSD was administered, and the religious or spiritual elements of LSD experiences. Such exploratory research seemed possible in the 1950s, but pharmaceutical manufacturer Sandoz's reaction to the Drug Efficacy Amendments of 1962 limited research to hospital-based, government-endorsed studies. Oram argues that these initial limits were motivated more by Sandoz's business interest in controlling LSD research than by government suppression of a supposedly dangerous

substance. When Sandoz withdrew its sponsorship of LSD research in 1966 due to fears of critical publicity related to illicit LSD use, a joint initiative of the Food and Drug Administration, National Institute of Mental Health, and Veterans Administration continued sponsorship of a small number of clinical trials rather than close the research altogether. In this climate of shrinking opportunities for psychedelic research, the research program at Spring Grove State Hospital near Baltimore, Maryland, flourished. Led by psychiatrist Albert Kurland and psychologist Sanford Unger, the program explored psychedelic therapy as a treatment for alcoholism, narcotic addiction, and end-of-life anxiety. Although the Spring Grove research program continued until 1976, it yielded inconclusive results and was ultimately overshadowed by negative findings from competing LSD trials that did not include a talk therapy component. In particular, a trial conducted by Jerome Levine and colleagues in partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health became definitive proof of LSD's lack of efficacy. The primacy of the clinical trial's design dwarfed the possibility that the study's lack of therapeutic preparation for participants and inattention to "set and setting" may have contributed to the negative results (176).

The Trials of Psychedelic Therapy concludes that the greatest threat to productive psychedelic therapy research may be adhering to the orthodoxy of the randomized clinical trial design in an attempt to prevent bad press. Science and sensationalism each played parts in the downfall of psychedelic therapy research in the twentieth century. This compelling medical history shows why social historians and clinician-researchers should pay attention to both variables.

CLAIRE D. CLARK
University of Kentucky

DAVID SHAMUS MCCARTHY. *Selling the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018. Pp. xi, 215. Cloth \$29.95.

Before Arlen Specter became a U.S. senator, he gained national attention for serving on the Warren Commission that investigated the assassination of President Kennedy. Dubbed "Single Shot Specter," he devised the theory that just one bullet had struck JFK and Texas governor John Connally, a finding seen as implausible by others who studied the case. The single-bullet theory was only one of many aspects of Kennedy's murder suffused with doubt. Conspiracy theories even claimed that the CIA was somehow involved. JFK's assassination marked a turning point when the American public began its long descent into distrust of its own government. Was that distrust warranted? Half a century later, the CIA's own official historian released a report revealing that the agency had, in fact, engaged in a "be-

nign cover-up," withholding important information from the Warren Commission. As for Arlen Specter, he never fully shook off the pall of suspicion that enveloped so much of the affair. The joke circulated that every night Specter wrestled with his conscience—and won.

Just how much trust should we place in our intelligence agencies, especially when they are conducting public relations campaigns to manipulate us? And can our elected officials even be counted on to provide oversight? David Shamus McCarthy has devoted more than a decade to exposing the methods and sources employed by the CIA to bolster its public image. His *Selling the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy* begins not in 1963 with the Warren Commission but instead in 1975 with the Church Committee. This was the so-called Year of Intelligence, when three high-profile committees probed the agency's illegal operations, including spying on American citizens and assassinating foreign leaders (2–3). The book ends near the present, examining agency attempts to distort beliefs about the value of torture in the killing of Osama bin Laden. The history that McCarthy describes across those four decades shows, he asserts, a consistent drive to manipulate public opinion and conceal the agency's misdeeds. McCarthy contends that by enjoining journalists, seducing Hollywood, and thwarting attempts at transparency, the CIA has maintained its mystique at the cost of its honor.

In his acknowledgments, McCarthy notes that he has been influenced by the William Appleman Williams school of thought, suggesting that he approaches the subject from a distinctly left-wing perspective. And though the book does paint the CIA in a rather unfavorable light, if the worst incidents that McCarthy describes are true, then the agency has had a sordid history indeed. Case in point, McCarthy details the agency's efforts in 2005 to conceal its use of enhanced interrogation techniques by destroying the training videos it had created. The deputy to the CIA's executive director wrote in an email that if the tapes entered the public domain, then "out of context they would make us look terrible" (128). One wonders how much better a torture training video could have possibly looked *in context*. The agency official who drafted the instructions to destroy the videos was none other than Gina Haspel, the CIA's current director.

McCarthy's subject lends itself to moral ambiguity, which is what makes it so compelling. Unfortunately, the author does not always offer a balanced view. States need secrets to function, and governments need openness to prevent corruption. Both are essential if a democracy is to survive. *Selling the CIA* suggests that the agency has tilted much too far toward secrecy at the expense of morality. The solution, however, may require stricter oversight, not greater transparency as McCarthy implies.